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Abstract
What is the relation between metaphysical necessity and essence? This paper defends
the view that the relation is one of identity: metaphysical necessity is a special case
of essence. My argument consists in showing that the best joint theory of essence and
metaphysical necessity is one in which metaphysical necessity is just a special case of
essence. The argument is made against the backdrop of a novel, higher-order logic of
essence (HLE), whose core features are introduced in the first part of the paper. The
second part investigates the relation between metaphysical necessity and essence in the
context of HLE. Reductive hypotheses are among the most natural hypotheses to be
explored in the context of HLE. But they also have to be weighed against their non-
reductive rivals. I investigate three different reductive hypotheses and argue that two
of them fare better than their non-reductive rivals: they are simpler, more natural, and
more systematic. Specifically, I argue that one candidate reduction, according to which
metaphysical necessity is truth in virtue of the nature of all propositions, is superior to the
others, including one proposed by Kit Fine, according to which metaphysical necessity is
truth in virtue of the nature of all objects. The paper concludes by offering some reasons
to think that the best joint theory of essence and metaphysical necessity is one in which
the logic of metaphysical necessity includes S4, but not S5.
1 Introduction
What is the relation between metaphysical necessity and essence? In this paper, I argue that
the relation is one of identity: metaphysical necessity is a special case of essence. The idea
that necessity derives from, or is based on, essence can be traced back to Aristotle and has
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recently been revived by Kit Fine (1994).1 The intuitive motivation for this view can be
brought out by examples. For instance, it seems natural to suppose that the necessity of all
triangles having three sides flows from the nature of triangularity and that the necessity of all
red things being colored flows from the nature of redness.2 But while examples like these may
lend some plausibility to the view that all necessity derives from essence, they obviously do
not suffice to justify the view in full generality. In order to justify the view in full generality,
a more general and systematic argument is needed.
The aim of this paper is to provide such an argument. My argument consists in showing
that the best joint theory of essence and metaphysical necessity is one in which metaphysical
necessity is just a special case of essence. The argument is made against the background of a
novel logic of essence (HLE). This logic differs in a number of important respects from Fine’s
logic of essence (LE) (Fine, 1995, 2000), the only fully developed logic of essence previously
available in the literature. One central difference concerns their subject matter. The subject
matter of LE is not the conceptually basic notion of essence characterized in Fine (1994),
but what Fine calls the ‘constrained consequential notion’ of essence—an idealized notion of
essence that, roughly speaking, results from the basic notion of essence by closure under (a
restricted form of) logical consequence. In contrast, HLE is concerned with the conceptually
basic notion of essence. Another central difference is that unlike LE, which is formulated
in a first-order language, HLE is formulated in a higher-order language. The higher-order
framework has the advantage of allowing us not only to regiment talk about the essences of
objects in a straightforward way; it also provides a convenient and straightforward way of
regimenting talk about the essences of properties, propositions and logical operations, such
talk being central to our theorizing about essence.3
The framework of HLE suggests various different ways in which metaphysical necessity
might be reducible to essence. As we will see, reductive hypotheses are among the most natural
hypotheses to be explored in the context of HLE. But they also have to be weighed against
their non-reductive rivals. I argue that some of the reductive hypotheses fare better than
their non-reductive rivals: they are simpler, more natural, and more systematic. Specifically,
1For Aristotle’s view about the relation between essence and necessity, see e.g., Barnes (1994, p. 120),
Malink (2013, p. 126) and Bronstein (2016, ch. 3). Some version of the view that necessity is based on essence
was also held by Spinoza, Descartes and Leibniz; see Newlands (2013). For discussions of Fine’s thesis of the
reducibility of necessity to essence, see e.g., Hale (1996, 2002), Correia (2006, 2012), Cameron (2010), Vetter
(2011, 2020), Wildman (2018), Teitel (2019) and Ditter (2020). A non-reductive essentialist account of modality
is defended in Hale (2013).
2I will use ‘essence’ and ‘nature’ interchangeably throughout.
3The higher-order approach also allows us to sidestep the property-theoretic paradoxes that arise in the
context of a first-order theory of properties. Any first-order theory of essence that is supplemented with a
theory of properties would have to come up with a solution to these paradoxes. An analogous problem does not
obviously arise in the higher-order framework. Even someone who ultimately rejects the higher-order approach,
or thinks that the higher-order approach is less fundamental than the first-order approach (Fine, 1980), may
want to take the theory presented here as a starting point and attempt to translate it into their preferred
first-order framework.
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I argue that one candidate reduction, according to which metaphysical necessity is truth in
virtue of the nature of all propositions, is superior to the others, including the one proposed
by Fine (1994), according to which metaphysical necessity is truth in virtue of the nature
of all objects.4 My abductive argument for this reductive hypothesis is centrally based on
the standard characterization of metaphysical necessity as the broadest objective necessity.
However, even if metaphysical necessity is not the broadest objective necessity, I argue that
truth in virtue of the nature of all propositions is the broadest objective necessity, at least up
to necessary coextensiveness.
The theory proposed here also sheds new light on the question of the correct logic of
metaphysical necessity. I contend that, regardless of whether we adopt any of the reductive
accounts, there is good reason to believe that metaphysical necessity obeys all the principles
of S4, but not those of S5. I have recently suggested the same conclusion in Ditter (2020),
though my argument there rests on the acceptance of Fine’s reduction thesis in the context of
LE. The considerations put forward here show that the case for this revisionary conclusion
does not essentially depend on the acceptance of Fine’s reduction thesis or LE; in fact, it
would seem to carry over to any joint theory of essence and metaphysical necessity based on
HLE provided that metaphysical necessity is the broadest objective necessity.
The paper is in two parts. The first part (§2) outlines some of the core features of the
theory HLE, which will serve as our background essentialist theory. In the second part (§3), I
turn to the question of the relation between essence and metaphysical necessity. In Sections
3.1-3.3, I explore three different reductive hypotheses and assess their respective strenghts and
weaknesses. Section 3.4 provides an argument for the reducibility of metaphysical necessity
to essence based on the results of the foregoing sections and the premise that metaphysical
necessity is the broadest objective necessity. In Section 3.5, I present some difficulties for
maintaining S5 for metaphysical necessity in the context of a joint theory of essence and
metaphysical necessity and argue that there is good reason to reject the standard view that
the correct logic of metaphysical necessity is S5. Section 4 concludes. A technical appendix
provides some further formal details and establishes some of the formal results appealed to in
the main text.
2 The Theory HLE
In this section, I will introduce some of the core features of the theory HLE that will serve
as the base theory for our discussion.5 Since the prospects for an essentialist reduction of
4Fine has offered his most detailed defense of his reduction thesis in the context of LE. See Fine (1995), and
see Ditter (2020) for discussion.
5A more detailed development of HLE, including a model-theoretic semantics, is provided in Ditter (MS).
All consistency claims made in the present paper can be proved by using the model-theory developed there.
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metaphysical necessity crucially depend on what logical principles the notion of essence obeys,
it is worth stating explicitly those principles that will be central to all of the reduction theses
to be investigated later. The theory HLE contains some additional principles as well, but the
reduction theses I will investigate here only depend on the principles explicitly stated in this
section. The theory HLE as a whole should be judged by its overall systematicity, simplicity
and explanatory power. The motivations and justifications I provide for the individual
principles to be listed should therefore not be viewed as exhaustive; every principle of the
system is at least partially justified, in addition, by its contribution to the systematicity and
elegance of the overall theory.
2.1 Regimentation
The language I will be using to regiment essentialist statements is a generalization of Fine’s
regimentation in LE (Fine, 1995). In LE, essentialist statements are expressed by means of
operators subscripted with a one-place predicate, written F , where F picks out the subjects
of the essentialist attribution. For example, the intended meaning of a sentence of the form
Fφ is that it lies in the nature of the things which F that φ.6 This form of expression
allows us to state essentialist statements in which the subject of the essentialist attribution
is a collection of objects without having to reify “collections” as objects in their own right.
For example, we can formally render the sentence ‘It lies in the nature of all objects (taken
together) that everything is self-identical’ by subscripting the essentialist operator with a
predicate that applies to all objects.7
However, Fine’s formalism only allows us to pick out objects as the subjects of essentialist
attributions: LE is stated in a first-order language in which predicates only combine with
terms in name position. In order to straightforwardly express essentialist statements in which
properties, propositions, and logical operations can be the subjects of essentialist attributions,
it will be convenient to use a higher-order language. In such a language, predicates can
also combine with other predicates, sentences or operators to make a sentence. This allows
us to pick out the entities expressed by terms of these grammatical categories as subjects
of essentialist attributions in the same way in which Fine’s approach allows us to pick out
objects for this purpose, though we may need to use lists of subscripts in order to talk about
the collective nature of entities of different types. So, for example, if F is used to pick out
Socrates and G is used to pick out negation (i.e. what is expressed by ‘not’), we can use F,G
to express ‘it is true in virtue of the collective nature of Socrates and negation that’.
Let me make this a bit more precise. The language we will be working with is a relationally
6Equivalently: It is essential to the things which F that φ. Or: It is true in virtue of the nature of the
things which F that φ.
7Note that I will be using all of the following expressions interchangeably: (i) ‘the collective nature of . . .’;
(ii) ‘the nature of the collection of . . .’; (iii) ‘the nature of . . . taken together’.
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typed language with lambda abstraction.8 The set of types is generated by the following rules:
(i) e is a type;
(ii) if τ1, ..., τn are types, n ≥ 0, then 〈τ1, ..., τn〉 is a type;
(iii) if τ is a type, then [τ ] is a type.
Informally speaking, e is the type of objects, 〈τ1, ..., τn〉 is the type of ordinary relations
between entities of type τ1, ..., τn with the special case 〈〉 being the type of propositions, and
[τ ] is the type of rigid properties of entities of type τ . Intuitively, a rigid property is a property
of being one of x1, x2, ..., for certain specific entities x1, x2, .... We can thus think of rigid
properties as predicative analogs of pluralities. Rigid properties are, like pluralities and sets,
“extensional” in that their identity is completely determined by the entities they apply to.9
Every syntactic item of our language is assigned a unique type from the above hierarchy
of types representing its syntactic category. The syntactic items of our language are called
terms. We call terms of type 〈〉 formulas (or sentences if they don’t contain free variables),
terms of type 〈τ1, . . . , τn〉 (ordinary) predicates, and terms of type [τ ] rigid predicates.10 We
assume that our language contains infinitely many variables of every type as well as a fixed
stock of typed constants. The set of terms of the language is recursively defined as follows:
(i) Every constant or variable of type τ is a term of type τ ;
(ii) if n ≥ 1, A is a term of type 〈τ1, . . . , τn〉 and B1, . . . , Bn are terms of type τ1, . . . , τn,
respectively, then A(B1, . . . , Bn) is a term of type 〈〉;
(iii) if A is a term of type [τ ] and B is a term of type τ , then A(B) is a term of type 〈〉;
(iv) if n ≥ 1, φ is a term of type 〈〉 and v1, . . . , vn are pairwise distinct variables of type
τ1, . . . , τn, respectively, all of which are free in φ, then (λv1 . . . vn.φ) is a term of type
〈τ1, . . . , τn〉.11
8The use of relationally typed languages goes back to Orey (1959). See Gallin (1975) for applications to
formal semantics and Fine (1977), Dorr (2016) and Williamson (2013) for applications in metaphysics. The
particular type system including rigid types (clause (iii) below) that is used here is closely related to the
systems in Myhill (1958) and Fine (1977), which distinguish between extensional and intensional types. The
rigid types employed here correspond to their extensional types, while the non-rigid types generated by clause
(ii) below correspond to their intensional types. Fritz et al. (2021) use an intensional relational type theory
with a single extensional type for pluralities of propositions.
9See the axioms for rigidity at the end of Section 2.2 and the appendix for further details.
10Our use of rigid predicates is a higher-order generalization of the category of rigid predicates in LE; see
Fine (1995, 2000).
11 The last clause indicates that we are working with a so-called λI-language in which vacuous variable
binding is not well-formed. This is mainly a matter of convenience. We could instead allow for vacuous variable
binding and restrict the principle of β-conversion introduced below to its non-vacuous instances.
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We call types of the form 〈σ〉 or [σ] one-place predicate types and terms of this type one-place
predicates. Our language contains the logical constants ¬ (of type 〈〈〉〉), ∧,∨, → and ↔
(of type 〈〈〉, 〈〉〉); for every type σ, ∀σ and ∃σ (of type 〈〈σ〉〉, and identity predicates ≡σ
(of type 〈σ, σ〉); for any n ≥ 0 and any one-place predicate types τ1, . . . , τn, τ1,τ2,...,τn (of
type 〈τ1, ..., τn, 〈〉〉). Constants of this latter kind are essentialist operators. The case where
n = 0 is written ∅.12 The operation of lambda-abstraction (clause (iv)) allows us to form
complex predicates from formulas with free variables. For example, we can form the predicate
λxe.x ≡e x (‘is self-identical’) from the formula x ≡e x by applying clause (iv) above.
When F1, F2, . . . , Fn are one-place predicates and φ is a formula, we write F1,F2,...Fnφ
for τ1,...,τn(F1, ..., Fn, φ). We also write ∀xτ (φ) for ∀τ ((λxτ .φ)), and φ ∧ ψ for ∧(φ, ψ), and
similarly for other logical constants. Note that in this setting, quantifiers don’t bind variables,
and they combine with predicates—and not formulas—to make sentences. For instance, if
F is a predicate of type 〈σ〉, then ∀σ(F ) states that F applies to every entity of type σ (or,
equivalently, that F is universal). Thus, to express that everything of type e is self-identical,
we can write ∀e((λx.x ≡e x)), which can be abbreviated to the more usual ∀xe(x ≡e x)
given our convention above. I will generally omit parentheses and type annotations whenever
no confusion can arise and follow other standard conventions. For example, we may write
∀x(x ≡ x) instead of ∀xe(x ≡e x) whenever it is clear from the context what the appropriate
types are.
Here is how essentialist statements can be represented in this language. Let H(s) stand for
‘Socrates is human’. We can form the predicate λx.x ≡ s, which invariably applies to Socrates,
to form the sentence λx.x≡sH(s) expressing that it is essential to Socrates that Socrates is
human. Analogously, we can talk about the nature of negation by using a predicate of type
〈〈〈〉〉〉. One such predicate is λO.¬ ≡ O. We can then express that it lies in the nature of
negation that Socrates is human by the sentence λO.¬≡OH(s).13 As mentioned above, in
order to express essentialist statements whose subjects are collections of entities of different
types we need to use lists of subscripts, since our predicates can only combine with terms
of a fixed type. So, for example, we can formalize the claim that it lies in the nature of the
collection of Socrates and negation that Socrates is human by subscripting the essentialist
operator with the predicates λx.x ≡ s and λO.¬ ≡ O from above: λx.x≡s,λO.¬≡OH(s).
In order to succinctly express claims about the nature of particular entities, such as
Socrates, negation, or redness, we use expressions of the form [A] to abbreviate expressions of
the form λxσ.x ≡ A, where A is a term distinct from x in which x does not occur free. Thus,
truth in virtue of the nature of Socrates can be expressed by [s], and truth in virtue of the
12We will later use the symbol ‘’ to express metaphysical necessity, hence the special notation for the
essentialist operator where n = 0.
13Note that this claim is no more about the expression ‘¬’ than claims about Socrates’ nature are about the
name ‘Socrates’, and mutatis mutandis for other claims like this.
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nature of negation by [¬].14 The claim that it lies in the collective nature of Socrates and
negation that Socrates is human can then be simply written [s],[¬]H(s).
The formalism also allows us to express truth in virtue of the nature of all objects (entities of
type e) and truth in virtue of the nature of all propositions (entities of type 〈〉) by subscripting
the relevant essentialist operators with the predicates λxe.x ≡ x and λp〈〉.p ≡ p, which apply
to all objects and all propositions, respectively. The essentialist operators λxe.x≡x and
λp〈〉.p≡p, whose respective subjects are the collection of all objects and propositions, will be
of special interest in our discussion of the reducibility of necessity to essence later.
Here are some more examples of formalized sentences:
1. (a) [s]H(s)
(It is essential to Socrates to be human)
(b) [E]∀x(E(x)→ C(x))
(It lies in the nature of being an electron that all electrons are negatively charged)
(c) ¬NH(s)
(It is not in the collective nature of the natural numbers that Socrates is human)
(d) [∀],[¬],[∨],[R]∀x(R(x) ∨ ¬R(x))
(It lies in the collective nature of being red, universality, negation and disjunction that
everything is either red or not red)
(e) λp〈〉.p≡p∃p p
(It is true in virtue of the collective nature of all propositions that there is a true
proposition)
I will often pronounce sentences of our higher-order language by using terms such as ‘entities’,
‘properties’ and ‘propositions’. Since it is often the case that sentences in a higher-order
language cannot be synonymously translated into natural language, this talk of ‘entities’,
‘properties’ and ‘propositions’ should only be taken to be a rough ordinary language approx-
imation of what is more perspicuously expressed in our higher-order language. However,
according to the view embraced here, this does not cast any doubt on whether the sentences
are meaningful and capable of expressing truths.15
14Note that there are two distinct uses of the square brackets ‘[ ]’: one for rigid types, and one for abbreviating
predicates of the form λxσ.x ≡ y. The uses are systematically related in that the latter predicates ‘rigidly’
pick out the entities to which they apply; although they are not rigid in the syntactic sense of having rigid
type, their logic is in many ways analogous to the logic of predicates of rigid type.
15For a defense of this attitude toward higher-order languages, see Prior (1971) and Williamson (2013). See
also Rayo and Yablo (2001), Dorr (2016) and Goodman (2017).
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2.2 Some logical principles
I will now introduce the logical principles of HLE that will be presupposed in our discussion of
the reduction of necessity to essence in Section 3. A full list of principles is given in Appendix
A.1.
Our background logic will be classical higher-order logic with identity. The only principles
explicitly about identity that will be assumed here are reflexivity and the substitutivity of
identicals. We further assume that essence is factive and monotonic, in the following sense:
(T) F1,...,Fnφ→ φ
(Monotonicity) If X is a subcollection of Y , then if it lies in the nature of X that φ
then it lies in the nature of Y that φ16
Monotonicity entails that the essence of a collection contains all the truths that are true in
virtue of the nature of the members of the collection. For example, if it lies in the nature of
Plato to be human, then it lies in the nature of all humans, and indeed all objects, that Plato
is human, because Plato is one of the humans. We can think of the addition of new entities to
the subject of an essentialist attribution as roughly analogous to the addition of new truths
to some true theory, where the theorems of the old theory correspond to the propositions that
are true in virtue of the collective nature of the entities in the original essentialist attribution.
Our use of lambda-abstraction is guided by the following standard principle:17
(β-conversion) φ↔ φ∗, provided φ and φ∗ are β-equivalent18
For example, β-conversion and the reflexivity of identity imply that the propositions expressed
by the sentences H(s) (‘Socrates is human’) and (λX.X(s))(H) (‘Being human applies to
Socrates’) are identical.19 The main role β-conversion plays in our theory is in enabling us to
introduce a natural and well-behaved notion of essential involvement. Intuitions about what
is or isn’t involved in the nature of some entity often guide verdicts about what is essential
to what. For example, one reason for denying that it is essential to Socrates that he be a
16In order to capture Monotonicity in our formal language we have to make sure that if the predicates
F1, . . . , Fn pick out some entities that form a (proper or improper) subcollection of the entities picked out by
G1, . . . , Gm, then F1,...,Fnφ materially implies G1,...,Gmφ. This is jointly captured by the principles MON1,
MON2, Permutation, Idempotence, Separation, and Subtraction, listed in Appendix A.1. Whenever I appeal
to Monotonicity in the text in a formal argument, the appeal should be understood as referring to one or
more of these formal principles. Both (T) and Monotonicity are higher-order generalizations of the analogous
first-order principles in Fine’s LE. The first-order analog of Monotonicity can be expressed by a single axiom;
see Fine (1995, p. 247).
17See Dorr (2016) for a detailed discussion of β-conversion.
18φ and φ∗ are β-equivalent if φ∗ is derived from φ by replacing some constituent of the form
(λv1 . . . vn.ψ)(t1, ..., tn) with ψ[ti/vi], where ψ[ti/vi] is the sentence that results from replacing each free
occurrence of v1 in ψ with t1, and each free occurrence of v2 with t2, and so on, replacing bound variables in
such a way that no free variables in any ti become bound.
19Because (H(s) ≡ H(s))↔ (H(s) ≡ (λX.X(s))(H)) is an instance of β-conversion.
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member of his singleton set is that, intuitively, his singleton set is not involved in his nature.
Similarly, it is natural to suppose that it’s not in the nature of being an electron that all red
things are colored, on the grounds that redness or being colored are plausibly not involved in
(or don’t “figure in”) the nature of being an electron. Unlike Fine’s LE, which construes the
relation of essential involvement (which he calls ‘dependence’) as one that can only obtain
between objects, the framework of HLE allows us to construe the relation as one that can
obtain between entities expressed by any grammatical category, as illustrated by the last
example. As we will see below, the ability to capture this unrestricted notion of essential
involvement turns out to be of central systematic importance.
Formally, we define, for any n ≥ 0, type τ and one-place predicate types σ1, . . . , σn, a
predicate σ1,...,σn,τ of type 〈σ1, . . . , σn, τ〉:
(F1, . . . , Fn) σ1,...,σn,τ x =df ∃P 〈τ〉F1,...,FnP (x)
In words: for the nature of the collection of entities picked out by F1, . . . , Fn to involve xτ is
for there to be some property P 〈τ〉 such that it lies in the nature of the collection that x has
P . In what follows, we will normally suppress the types of the predicates on the left-hand
side and simply write τ for τ1,...,τn,τ . We further define:
cτ (F1, . . . , Fn) =df λxτ .(F1, . . . , Fn) τ x.
The predicate cτ (F1, . . . , Fn) is satisfied by all and only those entities of type τ that are
involved in the nature of the collection of entities picked out by F1, . . . , Fn. For example,
ce([s]) is satisfied by all and only the objects involved in Socrates’ nature and c〈〉([∧]) is
satisfied by all and only the propositions involved in the nature of conjunction. It will be
useful to introduce a special notation for the case in which an entity is involved in the nature
of a particular entity. To this end, we define, for any types σ and τ , a predicate ≥σ,τ of type
〈σ, τ〉:
x ≥σ,τ y =df ∃P 〈τ〉[x]P (y)
For example, for yτ to be involved in Socrates’ nature is for there to be some property P 〈τ〉
such that it lies in the nature of Socrates that y has P .20 In what follows, I will often omit
type subscripts and write ≥ instead of ≥σ,τ .
To illustrate, suppose that Socrates is essentially human ([s]H(s)). Then since H(s)
and (λX.X(s))(H) are β-equivalent, it follows that the nature of Socrates involves the
property of being human (because by existential generalization, [s](λX.X(s))(H) implies
∃Y 〈〈e〉〉[s]Y (H), which is just s ≥ H). Suppose now that the nature of Socrates does not
involve sethood (¬(s ≥ set)). It then follows that it is not in the nature of Socrates that he be
20Notice that x ≥σ,τ y is the same as ([x]) 〈σ〉,τ y.
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a member of some set, since otherwise Socrates’ nature would involve sethood.21 We can also
capture the perhaps less familiar idea that a logical operation may or may not be involved
in the nature of a collection of entities. For example, if Socrates is essentially human and
wise ([s](H(s) ∧W (s))), then his nature involves conjunction (s ≥ ∧).22 As we will see in
Section 2.3, the idea that a logical operation may or may not be involved in the nature of
some entities plays an important part in explaining under what conditions the essence of a
collection of entities manifests any type of logical closure.
Two formal features of essential involvement are worth mentioning before we move on.
First, essential involvement is transitive:
(≥-Transitivity) t ≥τ,σ s ∧ s ≥σ,ρ r → t ≥τ,ρ r
If the nature of x involves y and the nature of y involves z, then the nature of x involves z as
well. ≥-Transitivity follows from the principle of Inheritance introduced in the next section.
Essential involvement is also reflexive:
(≥-Reflexivity) s ≥σ,σ s
This should be relatively uncontroversial given our understanding of essential involvement.
Among the propositions that are true in virtue of the nature of x there should be at least
one that predicates something of x. In HLE, ≥-Reflexivity follows from the following two
principles guiding the logic of rigid predicates:
(R-Comp) ∀X〈σ〉∃Y [σ]∀xσ(X(x)↔ Y (x))
(Rigidity) F [σ](x)→ FF (x)
R-Comp says that for any property of any type there is a rigid property coextensive with it.23
Rigidity says that if x is one of some entities, then it lies in the nature of those entities that x
is one of them. Let us call the rigid property that applies to x and only x the haecceity of x.24
When F is the haecceity of x, we say that F (x) is the haecceity proposition of x. Rigidity and
the fact that every entity is in the extension of its haecceity entail that it is essential to x that
21Proof. [s]∃x(set(x)∧s ∈ x) implies [s](λX.∃x(X(x)∧s ∈ x))(set) by β-conversion, whence ∃Y[s]Y (set)
follows by existential generalization.
22Proof. Recall that φ∧ψ is shorthand for ∧(φ, ψ). By β-conversion, we infer (b) [s](λX.X(H(s),W (s)))(∧)
from (a) [s]∧(H(s),W (s)). By existentially generalizing on (λX.X(H(s),W (s))) in (b) we obtain ∃X[s]X(∧),
which is just s ≥ ∧.
23R-Comp is analogous to a comprehension principle for pluralities, according to which for every property,
there is a plurality coextensive with it. The relevant principle for pluralities is often restricted to properties
with a non-empty extension, a restriction we don’t impose for rigid properties. Compare Linnebo (2017) and
Burgess (2004).
24The uniqueness presupposition is justified by the aforementioned extensionality principle for rigid properties.
Although this principle is officially included in HLE, it will not be presupposed in our discussion of the reduction
theses in the next section, and is therefore not listed here.
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its haecceity proposition be true. So for every x, the essentiality of its haecceity proposition
witnesses the reflexivity of essential involvement.25
2.3 Logical closure
One of the key differences between metaphysical necessity and essence is that unlike meta-
physical necessity, the notion of essence is not in general closed under logical consequence.
For example, we may plausibly deny that the number two’s being essentially even entails that
it is essentially even or human, on the grounds that the nature of the number two presumably
doesn’t involve the property of being human. The Problem of Logical Closure is the problem
of specifying under what conditions the nature of a collection manifests any type of logical
closure. HLE provides a general and systematic solution to this problem. In HLE, any type
of logical closure in the essence of a collection derives from the logical operations that are
involved in the essence of the collection. Thus, for example, the essence of a collection will
be closed under modus ponens or conjunction introduction if and only if the essence of the
collection involves the conditional or conjunction, respectively.26
The way in which essences are closed under logical consequence is roughly analogous
to the way in which a deductively closed theory in a given language is closed under logical
consequence. Think of the entities that are involved in the nature of a given collection as a
kind of metaphysical analog of the language of a deductively closed theory; these entities can
be thought of as the “language” in which the essence is stated. A deductively closed theory
is closed under precisely those logical consequences that are expressible in the language of
the theory. If its language does not include the conjunction symbol, say, then no sentence in
which that symbol occurs will be part of the theory; if it does contain the conjunction symbol
and we assume that the symbol is guided by the usual classical laws for conjunction, then
the theory will be closed under conjunction elimination and introduction, and similarly for
other logical constants. Assuming that we have names for every entity involved in the nature
of a given collection C, let LC , the language of C, be the collection of terms designating
entities involved in the nature of C. The essence of C is then closed under precisely those
logical consequences that can be expressed in LC . For example, if LC contains ∀e and it is
true in virtue of the nature of C that ∀xF (x), then it is also true in virtue of the nature of C
that F (a), provided a is in LC , and similarly for other logical constants. Moreover, just as a
25A formal proof ≥-Reflexivity, which also invokes R-Comp, can be found in Appendix A.2 under Proposition
2.
26The way HLE handles the Problem of Logical Closure marks a crucial difference to LE. Since LE deals with
the idealized constrained consequential notion of essence, it licenses a very permissive type of logical closure.
Roughly speaking, in LE the essence of every entity is closed under qualitative consequence, where a sentence
φ is a qualitative consequence of a class of sentences Γ if φ is a consequence of Γ and φ expresses a qualitative
proposition. Thus, e.g. the proposition that everything is either human or not human is true in virtue of the
nature of any given entity according to LE. In LE it also follows from the number two’s being essentially even
that it is essentially even or human.
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deductively closed theory does not contain sentences involving vocabulary that is not part of
the language of the theory, so too the essence of a collection does not contain “extraneous
entities”, i.e. entities that are not involved in the nature of the collection.
Formally, this account of the logical closure of essences is jointly captured by the following
two principles (` denotes theoremhood in HLE):
(RC) If ` φ1∧. . .∧φn → ψ, then ` F1,...,Fkφ1∧. . .∧F1,...,Fkφn → F1,...,Fk,[A1],...,[Am]ψ,
where A1, . . . , Am are all the constants and free variables occurring in ψ but not any of
φ1, . . . , φn
(CH) G1,...,Gn,cσ(F1,...,Fk)φ→ G1,...,Gn,F1,...,Fkφ;
Recall that cσ(F1, . . . , Fk) picks out the collection of entities of type σ involved in the nature
of the collection picked out by F1, . . . , Fn. CH says that anything that is true in virtue of the
nature of the former collection is true in virtue of the nature of the latter.27 In other words,
whatever is true in virtue of the collective nature of the entities involved in the nature of
a given collection is true in virtue of the collection. The following consequence of CH is of
special importance:
(Inheritance) (F1, . . . , Fn) σ x ∧G1,...,Gk,[x]φ→ G1,...,Gk,F1,...,Fnφ.
Inheritance says that if the nature of some collection involves an entity x, then whatever
is true in virtue of the nature of x is also true in virtue of the nature of the collection; the
collection “inherits” the nature of the entities that are involved in its nature.
RC and Inheritance jointly entail that the nature of a collection is closed under all and only
those logical consequences that are statable in terms of vocabulary expressing entities that
are involved in the nature of the collection. For example, the nature of a collection is closed
under conjunction elimination/introduction just in case the nature of the collection involves
conjunction. Closure under conjunction elimination follows from RC alone. Suppose it lies in
the nature of Socrates to be human and wise ([s]H(s) ∧W (s)). It then follows immediately
by RC that Socrates is both essentially human ([s]H(s)) and essentially wise ([s]W (s)).
The rationale for this is that the fact that Socrates is essentially human and wise entails that
his nature involves conjunction (s ≥ ∧). To show closure under conjunction introduction,
we need to invoke Inheritance. For suppose (a) that Socrates is essentially human and (b)
that he is essentially wise. RC then only allows us to infer (c) that it is essential to Socrates
together with conjunction that Socrates is essentially human and wise ([s],[∧]H(s) ∧W (s)).
If we additionally assume that Socrates’s nature involves conjunction, Inheritance permits us
to infer from (c) that he is essentially human and wise.
27CH is a higher-order generalization of the “chaining axiom” from LE; see Fine (1995).
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In HLE, it is consistent to deny, for example, that the number two’s being essentially
even entails that the number two is essentially even or human ([2](E(2) ∨ H(2)). RC
merely allows us to infer [2],[∨],[H](E(2) ∨H(2)) from [2]E(2); so unless the nature of the
number two involves both disjunction and the property of being human, the problematic
entailment is blocked. However, even if its nature involves disjunction, which would entail
[2],[H](E(2)∨H(2)), we can still consistently deny [2](E(2)∨H(2)), so long as the nature of
the number two does not involve the property of being human, since no “extraneous entities”
can be introduced via logical closure.
A special case of the Problem of Logical Closure concerns the logical truths. It would
be natural to assume that those necessities that are expressed by logical truths, such as
‘Everything is self-identical’ or ‘Everything is either red or not red’, have their source at least
in part in the essences of the relevant logical operations. The special case of RC where n = 0
predicts just that:
(RC0) If ` ψ, then ` [A1],...,[Am]ψ, where A1, . . . , Am are all the constants and free
variables occurring in ψ
It is a consequence of RC0 that every logical truth whose only constants are logical constants
is true in virtue of the nature of the logical operations expressed by these constants. So, for
example, since ∀x(x ≡ x) is a logical truth whose only constants are ∀ and ≡, RC0 entails
[∀],[≡]∀x(x ≡ x). RC0 also entails [∀],[¬],[∨],[R]∀x(R(x) ∨ ¬R(x)), since ∀x(R(x) ∨ ¬R(x))
(‘Everything is either red or not red’) is a logical truth whose only constants are ∀, ¬, ∨, and
R. However, RC0 does not entail that this logical truth is true solely in virtue of the nature
of universality, negation, and disjunction; it only entails that it is true in virtue of the nature
of these logical operations together with redness. In general, RC0 does not entail that every
logical truth is true solely in virtue of some logical operations, since this would implausibly
entail that the collective nature of the logical operations involves absolutely every entity of
any type.
Our discussion of the Problem of Logical Closure has illustrated what might be the
most salient difference between the logic of metaphysical necessity and the logic of essence:
metaphysical necessity is closed under logical entailment, whereas essence is, in general, not.
Indeed, the account of logical closure presented here allows for there to be essences that are
“logically inert”, in the sense of not being closed under logical consequence at all. But we
have also seen that, although the essentialist operators fail to obey certain modal principles,
such as the closure under conjunction introduction, they do obey qualified versions of these
principles. For example, while [x]φ and [x]ψ together do not generally imply [x]φ ∧ ψ,
they do imply [x],[∧]φ ∧ ψ. In general, exactly which logical principles a given subscripted
essentialist operator F1,...,Fn obeys crucially depends on which entities are picked out by
F1, . . . , Fn. And nothing I’ve said rules out that there are subscripted essentialist operators
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that are closed under logical consequence in the same way as metaphysical necessity is. In
fact, our solution to the Problem of Logical Closure has provided a necessary and sufficient
condition for this: the nature of a collection of entities is closed under unrestricted consequence
just in case it involves absolutely every entity of any type.28
2.4 Iteration principles
Given that essentiality is expressed by means of operators in HLE, it is natural to ask whether
these operators can be iterated. For example, do we have an essentialist analog of the 4-schema
for metaphysical necessity, according to which every necessary truth is necessarily necessary?
That is, does it lie in the nature of x that it lies in the nature of x that φ whenever it lies in
the nature of x that φ? Formally: Do we have Fφ→ FFφ, where F is the haecceity of
x? One reason to doubt that this holds in general is that it would entail that essentiality (i.e.
what is expressed by the essentialist operator σ) is involved in the nature of any x, because
FFφ implies x ≥ σ, provided F is the haecceity of x.29
But even if the exact analog of the 4-schema for metaphysical necessity doesn’t hold for
essence, it is worth asking whether a qualified version of it holds. One natural qualification to
consider is to add essentiality to the subject of the essentialist attribution in the consequent:
Fφ→ F,[σ ]Fφ.30 Thus qualified, and assuming that F is the haecceity of x, the principle
states that whenever it lies in the nature of x that φ, then it lies in the nature of x together
with essentiality that it lies in the nature of x that φ. This qualified version of the principle
avoids the consequence that essentiality is involved in the nature of x.
A promising argument for the qualified principle stems from the fact that it provides a
natural essentialist explanation of the plausible assumption that it is not possible for anything
to lose any of its essence: if Fφ, then necessarily, Fφ. For F,[σ ]Fφ implies that it is
necessary that Fφ by the principle that essence implies necessity: whatever is true in virtue
of the nature of some entities is necessarily true. It is natural to suppose that the impossibility
of an entity to lose any of its essence flows in part from the nature of essentiality itself. We
will therefore adopt the following generalization of our qualified 4-schema, formulated in our
formal language:
28Sufficiency follows at once from RC, Inheritance and Monotonicity. For necessity, let x be some entity
whose nature doesn’t involve every entity of every type (the argument for non-single membered collections is
exactly analogous). Let y be an entity such that ¬(x ≥ y). Then ¬[x]y ≡ y, since otherwise [x](λz.z ≡ z)(y)
by β-conversion, and thus ∃P[x]P (y), which is just x ≥ y, in contradiction to our hypothesis.
29By the β-equivalence of Fφ and (λO.OFφ)(σ).
30One might, in addition, add the property of being F , so that the principle would read: Fφ →
F,[σ ],[F ]Fφ. However, in the presence of the principle R-Equiv (see Appendix A.1), this weakening
implies the seemingly stronger principle in the text. R-Equiv says that whatever lies in the nature of a rigid
property lies in the collective nature of the entities in its extension, and vice versa; the nature of a rigid
property is thus exhausted by the collective nature of the entities that it applies to.
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(4) F1,...,Fnφ → F1,...,Fn,[σ1,...,σn ]F1,...,Fnφ, whenever F
σ1
1 , ..., F
σn
n are rigid predi-
cates31
We can similarly ask whether we have an essentialist analog of the 5-schema for metaphysical
necessity, according to which what is not necessary is necessarily not necessary. As in the case
of the 4-schema, an exact analog for essence is implausible. Such an exact analog would say
that if it is not essential to x that φ, then it is essential to x that it is not essential to x that
φ. But this would implausibly entail not only that the nature of any x involves essentiality,
but also that it involves negation, and most problematically, any proposition φ not true in
virtue of the nature of x. However, we can again consider a qualified version of this principle.
The following principle, stated in our formal language, is a natural candidate:
(5) ¬F1,...,Fnφ → F1,...,Fn,[¬],[σ1,...,σn ],[φ]¬F1,...,Fnφ, whenever F
σ1




In (5) we have added essentiality as well as two additional elements to the subject of the outer
essentialist operator in the consequent of (5), namely negation and the proposition φ. The
latter two entities have to be added in order to avoid the problem, mentioned above, that the
nature of the entities picked out by F1, . . . , Fn may not involve φ or negation.33
I take (5) to be less evident than (4). We can give an argument for (5) that is parallel to
the argument for (4) above, although the first step of the argument is less straightforward
in the case of (5) than it is in the case of (4). The reason is that it is less clear that if φ
is not essential to the entities picked out by F1, . . . , Fn, then this is necessarily so. While
it is very plausible to hold that it is not possible that entities lose any of their essence, it
seems less obvious that their essence couldn’t have been richer. This line of thought is closely
related to denials of the B-schema for metaphysical necessity—the principle that whatever
is the case is necessarily possibly the case—and corresponding denials of the necessity of
distinctness. Suppose x and y are actually distinct but could have been identical. Then
whatever is essential to x would be essential to y and vice versa in a circumstance in which
31The restriction to rigid predicates is required here, since the inner essentialist operator in the consequent
should have the same subject as the operator in the antecedent. The schema does not in general hold for
non-rigid predicates. For example, suppose that Mary is in fact the only person wearing a hat and that it is
essential to the persons wearing a hat that Mary is human. Then it needn’t be true that it is essential to the
persons wearing a hat, taken together with essentiality, that it is essential to the persons wearing a hat that
Mary is human, since it may not be the case that it is essential to Mary to be wearing a hat, and so it may not
be essential to whoever wears a hat that Mary is human. Such a case is averted if the predicates in (4) rigidly
pick out Mary.
32Principle (5), like (4), is subject to the restriction that the predicates be rigid. The motivation for this is
analogous to the motivation in the case of (4).
33We didn’t need to add φ in the case of (4) because, by Inheritance, it would be redundant given that the
nature of the entities picked out by F1, . . . , Fn already involves φ, in view of the antecedent of (4).
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they are identical. In particular, it would be essential to x to be identical to y.34 It is thus
possibly essential to x to be identical to y, although x is, by hypothesis, not identical to
y, and thus not essentially identical to y. This would be a counterexample to (5), since (5)
implies that whenever φ is not true in virtue of the nature of x, then φ is necessarily not
true in virtue of the nature of x, by the principle that essence implies necessity. The idea
that it is possible for some entities to have more essential features than they actually have is
intriguing, and it seems to me that it is not obviously false. Still, I will tentatively adopt (5)
here, although it is worth emphasizing that it is not required for the reduction of necessity to
essence I will defend in the next section. Whenever (5) is needed, I will explicitly say so.
This concludes the presentation of our theory. The next section examines the question of
whether metaphysical necessity can be reduced to essence in the setting of HLE.
3 Reducing metaphysical necessity to essence
Now that we have our theory of essence in place, we can ask how to extend it to a joint
theory of essence and metaphysical necessity. The theory HLE does not feature an operator
for metaphysical necessity, but such an operator could of course be added, together with
appropriate axioms and rules. Let  be an operator expressing metaphysical necessity. At the
very least, we should add the K- and T-schemas for  and close the resulting theory under
the rule of -necessitation (RN):
(K) (φ→ ψ)→ (φ→ ψ)
(T) φ→ φ
(RN) If ` φ, then ` φ
It is worth noting that the following controversial schemas become theorems upon adding the
above principles:35
(CBF) ∀xσφ→ ∀xσφ
(NNE) ∀xσ∃y(x ≡ y)
CBF is the converse Barcan formula (see Barcan (1946)). NNE expresses (first- and
higher-order) necessitism, the view that necessarily everything (of any type) is necessarily
34Or to x together with identity, if we want to avoid that x’s nature involves the property of identity (x ≥≡).
Note that [x],[≡]x ≡ x, but not [x]x ≡ x, is a theorem of HLE by RC0.
35Note that the derivation of CBF only requires K and RN, and that of NNE only RN, given a
classical quantificational logic.
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something.36 Avoiding these consequences requires either adopting a free quantificational
logic or giving up RN.37 I will pursue neither of those options here, though. As we will see
below, RN enjoys independent support in the present context. And since HLE is based on
a classical quantificational logic, adopting a free logic would amount to giving up HLE, and
thus the background theory of essence for our investigation.38
Slightly more controversially, we should presumably also add the 4-schema for metaphysical
necessity to obtain all the principles of S4 for :39
(4) φ→ φ
If we take the logic of metaphysical necessity to further include all the principles of S5, we
need to supplement the system with another principle. One standard principle that will do is
the B-schema for metaphysical necessity:
(B) ¬φ→ ¬φ
In the presence of the B-schema, the Barcan formula becomes derivable:
(BF) ∀xσφ→ ∀xσφ
BF entails that there could not have been more entities of any type. Note that BF is not
a theorem of the above system without B. Consequently, giving up BF does not require
giving up any principles of HLE. The status of BF and B will come under scrutiny later.
In addition to these purely modal principles, it would be natural to consider principles of
interaction between  and the essentialist operators. One particularly plausible principle of
this kind is the widely accepted principle that essence implies necessity, or, in other words,
that every essential truth is necessary, which we can express by the following schema:
(EN) F1,...,Fnφ→ φ
Given EN, RN becomes redundant, since it immediately follows from RC0 and EN. A
defense of EN will be provided in Section 3.4. For now, I will adopt the principle as a
plausible working hypothesis.
Once we adopt EN, it is very natural to wonder whether some kind of converse of it
holds as well: Is it the case that whenever φ is metaphysically necessary, it is true in virtue of
36See Williamson (2013) for a book-length defense of first- and higher-order necessitism. See Kripke (1963)
and Stalnaker (2003b) for first-order modal logics that invalidate first-order necessitism, and Stalnaker (2011)
and Fine (1977) for defenses of higher-order contingentism, the negation of higher-order necessitism. See Fritz
and Goodman (2016) for a detailed discussion of higher-order contingentism.
37See Williamson (2013, pp. 39 ff.).
38This is not to say that these options aren’t worth exploring. Quite the contrary. I think the investigation
of variants of HLE based on a free logic is of great interest. But such an investigation must be left for another
occasion.
39See Salmon (1989) for a prominent critique of the 4-schema and Williamson (1990, ch. 8) for critical
discussion.
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the nature of some entities? Another question that arises in this connection is whether there
is an operator expressible in the language of HLE without  that plays the logical role of .
In the following sections, I will explore three theses that give an affirmative answer to both of
these questions. All of these theses say that metaphysical necessity is just a special case of
essence. The question of whether we should prefer one of these reductive hypotheses over the
above-mentioned extensions of HLE with a primitive metaphysical necessity operator will be
discussed in Section 3.4.
In what follows, it will be useful to introduce a shorthand for referring to certain charac-
teristic modal principles where  is uniformly replaced by another unary operator. When Φ
is one of the schemas above and O is some unary operator, we use ΦO to indicate the result
of uniformly replacing  by O in the schema. So, for example, ENF denotes the schema
F1,...,Fnφ→ Fφ, and 4F the schema Fφ→ FFφ.
3.1 Objectual Reduction
The first thesis I want to explore is due to Fine (1994, p. 9):
Objectual Reduction
For a proposition to be metaphysically necessary is for it to be true in virtue of the
nature of all objects.
The Objectual Reduction offers a simple account of the connection between essence and
metaphysical necessity: the connection is one of identity—metaphysical necessity just is truth
in virtue of the nature of all objects, and thus a special case of essence. If the Objectual
Reduction is true, we do not need to add a new operator to HLE, because one of the essentialist
operators is metaphysical necessity. The essentialist operator that expresses truth in virtue
of the nature of all objects (entities of type e) is λxe.x≡x, which I will abbreviate as Ω.
The Objectual Reduction can then be formally expressed as the claim that Ω expresses
metaphysical necessity.
The tenability of the Objectual Reduction crucially depends on whether Ω obeys the
same logical principles as metaphysical necessity as well as the principle that essence implies
necessity. Given the Objectual Reduction, the latter principle says that every proposition
that is true in virtue of the nature of any entities (of any type) is true in virtue of the nature
of all objects. Unfortunately, HLE does not guarantee the truth of this principle. For example,
it is consistent with HLE that it is not true in virtue of the nature of any objects that all red
things are colored even if it lies in the nature of redness that all red things are colored. The
reason for this is that nothing in HLE requires the nature of any object or collection of objects
to involve such properties as being red or any of the logical operations. This entails further
that it is consistent with HLE that necessities expressed by logical truths, such as ‘Everything
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is self-identical’ or ‘All red things are red’, are not true in virtue of the nature of all objects,
and similarly for many other logical truths that are uncontroversially necessary. Thus, Ω is
not subject to necessitation, i.e. φ may be a theorem of HLE without Ωφ being a theorem,
even if we restricted necessitation to uncontroversially necessary logical truths like the above.
Moreover, while the TΩ- and KΩ-schemas both hold in HLE,40 the 4Ω- and BΩ-schemas
are not derivable. Thus, if we want to maintain the Objectual Reduction, we need to add
further principles concerning the nature of objects to HLE.
Here is one principle that addresses the problem head-on:
(R) ∀xτ∃F 〈e〉Fx ≡τ x
The axiom says that for any entity x of any type, there are some objects such that it is true
in virtue of the nature of these objects that x is self-identical. This entails that every entity
is involved in the nature of some collection of objects. The problem that there may be no
objects whose nature involves a given property or logical operation is thereby resolved.
However, the adoption of (R) may seem like an ad hoc fix. Is there any reason for assuming
(R) that is independent of the Objectual Reduction? One natural way to motivate (R) would
be to endorse some form of Platonism, positing for every entity of type 6= e some objectual
surrogate or Form of type e that stands in a specific relationship to the higher-order entity.
For example, a Platonist might think that to be human is to exemplify the Form humanity.
Where H stands for ‘human’, ε stands for ‘exemplifies’ and h stands for ‘humanity’, we
can express this by the following identification: H〈e〉 ≡〈e〉 λxe.ε〈e,e〉(x, h). In addition, the
Platonist could plausibly maintain that this identification is true in virtue of the nature
of the Form humanity: [h](H ≡ λx.ε(x, h)). But by the substitutivity of identicals, this
immediately implies [h]H ≡ H, witnessing an instance of (R).41
In order to justify (R), the Platonist would of course have to be able to give a more
general argument. She would have to show that the argument above, or something analogous,
generalizes to every entity of higher type. This could perhaps be done by endorsing some
restricted version of the following comprehension schema:
(P-Comp) ∀X〈σ1,...,σn〉∃ye(X ≡ λxσ11 . . . xσnn .ε(x1, . . . , xn, y)), where n ≥ 0
40The KΩ -schema is an immediate consequence of RC, while the TΩ -schema is just a special case of the
T-schema of HLE.
41According to an alternative, ground-theoretic, version of Platonism, the Form humanity is such that one’s
exemplifying it is grounded in one’s being human; see e.g., Dixon (2018). Formally: ∀x(H(x) < ε(x, h)), where
< stands for non-factive full ground. Such a Platonist might again plausibly maintain that this grounding
claim is true in virtue of the nature of the Form humanity: [h]∀x(H(x) < ε(x, h)), which implies h ≥ H,
witnessing an instance of a slight weakening of (R) to the effect that every entity is involved in the nature
of some collection of objects. Such a weakening of (R) would also suffice for the purpose at hand, though of
course this ground-theoretic version of Platonism—just like the version in the main text—would have to be
generalized to every entity of higher type in order to justify (R) (or its weakening). The obvious generalization
is, however, as paradox-prone as that of the Platonist theory in the main text. Thanks to an anonymous referee
here.
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Without any restriction, P-Comp leads to inconsistency, due to Russell’s paradox.42 But if
the Platonist could come up with a plausible restriction, the argument above, together with
the restricted version of P-Comp, might be used to derive (R). I will, however, not further
pursue this question here because there is a weaker, consistent Platonist theory that yields
(R) as well. I will only sketch the view here. The basic idea is that instead of positing the
existence of objectual surrogates for entities of every type, we only posit objectual surrogates
for propositions. Call this theory Propositional Platonism. Propositional Platonism can be
characterized by introducing a primitive predicate, true, of type 〈e〉, governed by the following
axiom:
(P-Truth) ∀p〈〉∃xe[x](true(x) ≡〈〉 p)
P-Truth immediately implies ∀p〈〉∃X〈e〉Xp ≡〈〉 p, and thus all instances of (R) in which
τ = 〈〉. But it turns out that we can also infer all other instances of (R) from this alone.43
In contrast to the stronger Platonist theory above, Propositional Platonism is provably
consistent.44
There is thus at least one systematic and consistent way of motivating (R). But since (R)
is clearly weaker than any of the Platonist theories above and there may also be other ways
of motivating (R), I will remain neutral here on what justification a proponent of (R) should
espouse and instead focus on the consequences of adopting (R).45 Let me now turn to these
consequences. Let HLER be the result of adding (R) to HLE. We first observe that ENΩ holds
in HLER. Intuitively, the reason is that if p is true in virtue of the nature of some collection of
entities x1, x2, . . ., then these entities are involved in the nature of some objects, by (R). So
these objects “inherit” the nature of x1, x2, . . ., which entails that p is true in virtue of the
nature of the objects. By Monotonicity, it follows that p is true in virtue of the nature of all
objects.46
We can further show that Ω is subject to necessitation in HLER. Suppose φ is a theorem
of HLER. Then by RC0, [A1],...,[An]φ is a theorem, where A1, . . . , An are all the constants
and free variables occuring in φ. Hence, by ENΩ and modus ponens, Ωφ is a theorem as
well. As mentioned above, the KΩ- and TΩ-schemas, and hence also CBFΩ and NNEΩ ,
already hold in HLE. The case of the 4Ω- and BΩ-schemas is less straightforward, but the
42Instantiate the variable X with λx.¬ε(x, x).
43Proof. Let xτ be arbitrary. Then x ≡τ x is of type 〈〉. Hence, by P-Truth, ∃ye[y](true(y) ≡〈〉 (x ≡τ x)),
and thus ∃ye(y ≥ x ∧ y ≥ ≡τ ) by β-conversion. But [x],[≡τ ]x ≡τ x is a theorem of HLE (by RC0), and so
∃ye[y]x ≡τ x follows by Inheritance and Monotonicity. So ∃F 〈e〉Fx ≡τ x. Since x was arbitrary, we get
∀xτ∃F 〈e〉Fx ≡τ x.
44A semantic consistency proof is given in Ditter (MS).
45An alternative motivation for (R) might derive from certain plenitudinous views about material objects.
Different versions of such views are described in, e.g. Bennett (2004), Fine (1999), Leslie (2011) and Yablo
(1987), See Fairchild (2020) for an overview. As Fairchild (2019) shows, there are some delicate issues involved
in the formulation of plenitudinous views about material objects.
46See Proposition 5 in Appendix A.2.
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4Ω-schema is in fact derivable in HLER, though the BΩ-schema is not. Thus, Ω obeys all
the principles of S4 in HLER.47 In order to obtain all the principles of S5 we would need to
add another axiom. The most promising candidate is Fine’s ‘domain axiom (ii)’ from LE
(Fine, 1995, p. 250):48
(DOM) ∀xeP [e](x)→ P∀xP (x)
DOM says that it is true in virtue of the nature of all objects that they are all the objects
there are (note that the predicate P in DOM is rigid). In the presence of DOM, BΩ , and
therefore also BFΩ , become derivable.49 A detailed discussion of DOM is postponed until
Section 3.5, where I will show that even without assuming the Objectual Reduction, the
question of whether DOM is true is intimately connected with the Barcan formula and the
B-schema for metaphysical necessity. Until then, I will remain neutral on whether a proponent
of HLER should accept DOM.
The conjunction of HLER and the Objectual Reduction offers a simple and compelling
joint theory of essence and metaphysical necessity. Yet, as it stands, it crucially relies on
the controversial axiom (R). Although we have seen that there is a way of motivating (R)
by adopting some form of Platonism, it is worth inquiring whether there are other ways of
reducing necessity to essence in the setting of HLE that are not committed to (R). A natural
suggestion would be to take metaphysical necessity to be based in the nature of propositions
(entities of type 〈〉) instead of objects. There are different forms such a reduction could take.
One proposal would be to take the metaphysical necessities to be the propositions that are
true in virtue of the nature of all propositions, in parallel to the Objectual Reduction. Another
natural proposal would be to identify the metaphysically necessary propositions with the
propositions that are true in virtue of their own nature. The next two sections will discuss
these two proposals in turn.
3.2 Universal propositional reduction
I begin with the propositional analog of the Objectual Reduction:
Universal Propositional Reduction
For a proposition to be metaphysically necessary is for it to be true in virtue of the
nature of all propositions.
47For a proof of 4Ω , see Proposition 6 in Appendix A.2. We can in fact show by semantic methods that Ω
obeys exactly the propositional modal logic S4 in HLER; see Ditter (MS).
48I have adopted the label ‘DOM’ from Ditter (2020), where the principle is discussed in the context of LE.
One could of course also just add BΩ directly, but this would be rather ad hoc.
49See Proposition 10 in Appendix A.2. Note that the proof of BΩ requires the essentialist (5)-schema from
Section 2.4. It is again possible to show that Ω obeys exactly the propositional modal logic S5 in HLER+DOM.
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The operator that expresses truth in virtue of the nature of all propositions is λp〈〉.p≡p, which
I will abbreviate as Π. Interestingly, Π already obeys all the principles of the modal logic
S4 as well as ENΠ in HLE. In the case of the Objectual Reduction, we had to appeal to (R)
in order to link the natures of entities of type 6= e to the natures of objects. The reason why
we needn’t do the analogous thing in the case of the Universal Propositional Reduction is that
the nature of every entity of any type is already reflected in the nature of some proposition by
virtue of the principles of HLE alone. More specifically, let x be an entity of any type. Then
there is a proposition—the haecceity proposition of x introduced in Section 2.2—whose nature
involves x; hence, by Inheritance, everything that is true in virtue of the nature of x is true in
virtue of the nature of its haecceity proposition.
To make this precise, we introduce the following abbreviation. Let F1, . . . , Fn be one-place
predicates. Then
h(F1, . . . , Fn) =df λp〈〉.(∃x(F1(x) ∧ ∃X [σ1](∀z(X(z)↔ x ≡σ1 z) ∧ p ≡
X(x))) ∨ · · · ∨ ∃x(Fn(x) ∧ ∃X [σn](∀z(X(z)↔ x ≡σn z) ∧ p ≡ X(x))))
The predicate h(F1, . . . , Fn) applies to all and only the haecceity propositions of the entities
picked out by F1, . . . , Fn.50 In HLE, every essentialist claim is logically equivalent to one with
a single subscript picking out the haecceity propositions of the entities that are the subject of
the original essentialist claim.51
(Haec) F1,...,Fnφ↔ h(F1,...,Fn)φ
ENΠ is an immediate consequence of Haec and Monotonicity. The fact that Π is subject
to necessitation is in turn an immediate consequence of RC0 and ENΠ . The KΠ- and
TΠ-schemas, and thus also CBFΠ and NNEΠ , are again immediate. Moreover, it turns
out that the 4Π-schema is derivable in HLE, but the BΠ-schema is not. So Π obeys all
the principles of S4, but not all the principles of S5 in HLE. To additionally obtain all the
principles of S5 as well as BFΠ , it is necessary to strengthen the system. In analogy to the
case of Ω, it is sufficient to add an axiom to the effect that it is true in virtue of the nature
of all propositions that they are all the propositions:52
(DOM〈〉) ∀x〈〉P [〈〉](x)→ P∀xP (x)
50It is worth noting that it is not generally the case that the haecceity proposition of an entity x is identical to
the haecceity proposition of an entity y (of the same type) only if x is identical to y. Otherwise there would be a
one-one correspondence between the domain of properties of propositions and the domain of propositions, which
is ruled out by the ‘Russell-Myhill Antinomy’. The result, which can be proved by a Cantorian diagonalization
argument, goes back to Russell (1903) (Appendix B) and was independently rediscovered by Myhill (1958).
See Klement (2010a) for a succinct presentation of this result and its relation to Cantor’s theorem.
51See Proposition 3 in Appendix A.2.
52Note that the proof of BΠ requires the essentialist (5)-principle from Section 2.4. One could again also
just add BΠ directly, but this would again be rather ad hoc.
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I will discuss the status of DOM〈〉 and its bearing on the question of whether Π obeys all
the principles of S5 in Section 3.5.
The Universal Propositional Reduction compares favorably with the Objectual Reduction
in HLE. For one thing, it doesn’t require any commitment to the controversial principle (R);
and for another, it is more parsimonious in its posits, suggesting itself quite naturally from
the principles of HLE alone, as we have just seen. The fact that Π, unlike Ω, already
obeys the characteristic logical principles of metaphysical necessity in HLE (or HLEDOM〈〉 if
we thought that metaphysical necessity obeys S5), makes it a prima facie natural candidate
for being metaphysical necessity. It is worth noting, however, that in the presence of (R), it
is an immediate consequence of ENΩ and ENΠ that anything that is true in virtue of the
nature of all objects is true in virtue of the nature of all propositions, and vice versa. Thus,
given (R), the difference between the Objectual Reduction and the Universal Propositional
Reduction becomes immaterial for most theoretical purposes, since the respective candidates
for expressing metaphysical necessity are logically coextensive.
3.3 Intrinsic propositional reduction
Let me now turn to the other propositional reduction mentioned before.
Intrinsic Propositional Reduction
For a proposition to be metaphysically necessary is for it to be true in virtue of its own
nature.
Prima facie, the idea that the necessity of a proposition is determined solely by the nature of
the proposition itself has a lot of intuitive appeal. To put it in epistemic terms, in order to
know whether a proposition is necessary it suffices to have a fully transparent grasp of the
nature of that proposition; we don’t need to look beyond its nature to determine whether it is
necessary. On this proposal, the necessity of a proposition is “intrinsic” to the proposition;
every necessary proposition is its own source of necessity.53
This is in stark contrast to our previous two reduction theses for which it was not always
possible to identify a particular object or proposition as the source of the necessity of a given
proposition. For example, the Universal Propositional Reduction only entails that if p is
necessary, then it is true in virtue of the nature of all propositions (equivalently, that it is true
53This is closely related to what Van Cleve (2018) calls ‘intrinsically explained’ or ‘inherently intelligible’
necessity—a kind of necessity that belongs ‘only to those necessary truths that are true in virtue of the natures
of their own constituents.’ (p. 18). This idea is in turn related to the notion of in se necessity invoked by
Leibniz, Wolff and Baumgarten; see Stang (2016). The appeal to “constituents” of propositions should be
treated with caution, however, at least insofar as it presupposes a structured account of propositions, since such
a theory is arguably inconsistent, due to the Russell-Myhill Antinomy (see note 50). For recent discussions of
the implications of the Russell-Myhill Antinomy for theories of structured propositions, see Dorr (2016), Fritz
et al. (2021), Goodman (2017), Klement (2010a,b), and Uzquiano (2015).
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in virtue of the nature of some propositions), but not that it is true in virtue of the nature of
some specific proposition. The Intrinsic Propositional Reduction, by contrast, always provides
us with a particular such instance, namely the proposition itself whose necessity is in question.
The operator that expresses that a proposition is true in virtue of its own nature is
λp.[p]p, which I will abbreviate as I . Let us call a proposition that is true in virtue of its
own nature intrinsically necessary for short. As in the case of the other reductions, we need
to check whether I obeys the logical principles of metaphysical necessity and the principle
that essence implies necessity (ENI ). It turns out that I satisfies neither ENI nor all
the principles of S4 in HLE. So, like the Objectual Reduction, the Intrinsic Propositional
Reduction requires additional assumptions.
The most natural option would be to simply add ENI to HLE. If, as suggested above,
the idea that all necessities are intrinsically necessary enjoys intuitive support, then ENI
does so as well. Once we add ENI , we also obtain all the principles of S4 for I , because by
ENI , we have Πφ→ Iφ, and by Monotonicity we have the converse as well. Hence, in
HLEENI , I and Π are logically coextensive, so the fact that Π obeys all the principles of
S4 immediately implies that I also obeys those principles.
Unfortunately, though, despite its initial appeal, ENI seems to be subject to counterex-
amples. Consider the claim that it lies in the collective nature of two entities, say Socrates and
his singleton set, that they are distinct. Given ENI , it follows that it lies in the nature of the
proposition that there are at least two objects that there are at least two objects. Formally:
Given ENI , [a],[b]¬(a ≡ b) implies [∃x∃y¬(x≡y)]∃x∃y¬(x ≡ y).54
But this is prima facie implausible, at least if we take the usual principles of quantificational
logic as our guide to the nature of a proposition that is expressed by a sentence whose only
constants are logical. For the negation of the sentence ‘There are at least two objects’
is consistent in classical quantificational logic; the usual logical principles governing the
existential quantifier, identity, and negation do not entail that there are at least two objects.
So the fact that it is not a logical truth that there are at least two objects would seem to be
good evidence for thinking that it is not in the collective nature of the existential quantifier,
identity, and negation that there are at least two objects, and hence that it is not intrinsically
necessary that there are at least two objects.55 Many philosophers share the view that logic
is not supposed to tell us how many objects there are,56 and the claim that it does not lie
in the nature of any logical operations alone that there are at least two objects is a natural
54Proof : Suppose [a],[b]¬(a ≡ b). By RC and existential generalization: [a],[b],[∃],[¬]∃x∃y¬(x ≡ y). By
ENI , this implies [∃x∃y¬(x≡y)]∃x∃y¬(x ≡ y).
55In HLE, [∃x∃y¬(x≡y)]∃x∃y¬(x ≡ y) and [∃],[≡],[¬]∃x∃y¬(x ≡ y) are in fact logically equivalent by the
axioms of Decomposition (see the appendix) and Inheritance, though I’m not relying on this logical equivalence
here; even if they were not in general logically equivalent, it is plausible enough to suppose that the former is
true only if the latter is.
56See Etchemendy (1990) and Hanson (1997) for discussion.
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essentialist counterpart of this claim.57 Even if it is metaphysically necessary that there are
at least two objects, and indeed that there are infinitely many objects, one may want to deny
that this is due solely to the nature of some logical operations (rather than, in addition, the
nature of (say) all the natural numbers).
This judgment can be resisted, however, if one took the account of logical truth proposed
by Tarski (1936) as a guide to the nature of the logical operations. One consequence of this
conception of logical truth is that every sentence that contains only logical vocabulary is either
logically true or logically false.58 On such a view, a sentence like ∃x∃y¬(x ≡ y) is logically
true if true at all, and the claim that it is intrinsically necessary that there are at least two
objects might be taken as a natural essentialist reflection of this view. The force of the above
counterexample may therefore depend to some extent on what conception of logical truth one
takes as a guide to the nature of the logical operations.
But there are other cases that, it seems, cannot be dealt with in this way. Consider the
claim that it lies in the nature of Socrates to be human. Given ENI , it follows from this
that it lies in the nature of something being human that something is human; in other words,
it is intrinsically necessary that there are humans.59 Formally: Given ENI , [s]H(s) implies
[∃xH(x)]∃xH(x).60 More generally, ENI entails that whenever some entity has a property
P essentially, then it is intrinsically necessary that P is instantiated. Similarly, suppose
(plausibly) that it lies in the nature of all propositions that something is not a natural number
(because it lies in the nature of all propositions that I am not a natural number, for example).
It then follows from ENI that it is intrinsically necessary that something is not a natural
number.
These consequences seem quite implausible. Intuitively, it would seem to be perfectly
compatible with the collective nature of being human and existence that there be no humans;
the fact that there are humans can’t plausibly be “read off” the collective nature of being
human and existence.61 Likewise, it is natural to think that it is perfectly compatible with
the collective nature of being a natural number and all the logical operations that everything
is a natural number; the nature of this collection doesn’t demand there to be anything that’s
57Fine (1995, p. 251) suggests a principle in the context of LE according to which, for any finite number of
objects, it is ‘logically possible’ that there be exactly this number of objects. It is natural to interpret the
appeal to ‘logical possibility’ there to be tantamount to something like ‘compatibility with the nature of the
logical operations’.
58See Williamson (2000) for a defense of this account of logical truth.
59Or perhaps more plausibly: suppose that Socrates is essentially human if concrete; it follows that it is
intrinsically necessary that something is human if concrete.
60The proof is similar to the proof of the entailment in the previous example.
61The same considerations apply, mutatis mutandis, to the modified case suggested in a previous footnote
where we suppose that Socrates is essentially human if concrete. Note that in HLE, [∃xH(x)]∃xH(x) and
[∃],[H]∃xH(x) are in fact logically equivalent by the axioms of Decomposition (see the appendix) and
Inheritance, though I’m not relying on their equivalence here, but merely on the plausible idea that if the latter
is false, the former is false as well.
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not a natural number. In explaining why it is metaphysically necessary that something is
not a natural number, for instance, one would naturally point to some object whose nature
precludes it from being a natural number, rather than to the natures of being a natural number
and perhaps some logical operations.
Taken together, it seems to me that these consequences count considerably against ENI ,
and thus against the Intrinsic Propositional Reduction. I conclude that, in the absence of a
compelling argument for accepting these consequences, the Intrinsic Propositional Reduction
should be rejected. That being said, the intrinsically necessary truths still constitute a very
interesting subclass of the metaphysically necessary truths that seems well worth investigating.
3.4 A general argument for an essentialist reduction of necessity
So far the case for the reduction theses above has consisted in showing that Π and Ω are
natural candidates for playing the role of metaphysical necessity on the grounds that they
satisfy the same logical principles as metaphysical necessity. However, all by itself, this is
consistent with Π and Ω being not even coextensive with metaphysical necessity. This
section provides an argument for their necessary coextensiveness, thereby providing further
evidence for their identification. (For definiteness, I will focus on the Universal Propositional
Reduction here, but the arguments below also apply to the Objectual Reduction.)
Metaphysical necessity is often characterized as the broadest necessity, or as necessity
in the highest degree.62 According to a standard way of spelling this out, the idea is that
a proposition is metaphysically necessary if and only if it is necessary in every ‘objective’
(Williamson (2016)) or ‘real’ (Rosen (2006)) sense of necessity. Besides metaphysical necessity,
paradigmatic examples of objective (or, equivalently, real) necessities include nomic necessity,
biological necessity, and practical necessity. The objective modalities are taken to exclude the
doxastic and epistemic modalities as well as the deontic and teleological modalities. According
to Williamson, ‘Objective modalities are non-epistemic, non-psychological, non-intentional.
Thus they are not sensitive to the guises under which the objects, properties, relations and
states of affairs at issue are presented’ (ibid. p. 454).63 Moreover, they are plausibly required
to satisfy at least some minimal logical requirements, such as that (i) a conjunction is necessary
just in case all of its conjuncts are necessary, and that (ii) every tautology is necessary.64
A key question in the characterization of objective necessity is whether the category of
objective necessity respects essence, in the sense that, whenever something is an essential truth,
it is necessary in every objective sense of necessity. If it does, then the role of the broadest
62See Kripke (1980) for a canonical reference. See also Fritz (2017), Hale (1996, 2013), Rosen (2006),
Stalnaker (2003a), Williamson (2016) and Van Inwagen (1998). See Bacon (2018) and Clarke-Doane (2019a,b)
for dissenting views.
63See also Rosen (2006, pp. 14 ff.), Nolan (2011, pp. 315 f.), and Rayo (2013, p. 49).
64See Williamson (2016, p. 456).
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objective necessity is tightly constrained, since the assumption that objective necessity respects
essence entails:65
(EON) Πφ→ Lφ
for any objective necessity operator L. Say that an objective necessity operator L1 is at least
as broad as another objective necessity operator L2 if and only if L3(L1p→ L2p), for every
objective necessity operator L3 and proposition p.66 If true, (EON) is plausibly necessary
in every objective sense of necessity. But Π is clearly itself an objective necessity, so it is
at least as broad as any other objective necessity.67 Now if metaphysical necessity is the
broadest objective necessity, then metaphysical necessity is at least necessarily coextensive
with Π. So Π is a very natural candidate for expressing metaphysical necessity. But even
if we lift the assumption that metaphysical necessity is the broadest objective necessity, the
argument would still establish that Π is the broadest objective necessity up to necessary
coextensiveness.
The principle (EON) strikes me as extremely compelling. Suppose that Socrates is
essentially human. Could there be an objective sense of possibility according to which it
is possible for Socrates not to be human? It would seem that any such possibility would
not be a possibility for Socrates—it would not be an objective way for Socrates to be. One
might be tempted to think that there is some kind of “logical possibility” according to which
Socrates could fail to be human, a possibility that somehow corresponds to the sentential
predicate of logical consistency. The paradigm cases of “logically necessary” truths would
presumably be truths like ∀p(p∨¬p) and H(s)→ ¬¬H(s) and a characteristic feature of this
kind of possibility would be that contradictions are not possible. However, even if there is
an operator that works like this and does not obey (EON)—which is not obvious—such a
sense of possibility and necessity would seem to arbitrarily privilege the nature of the logical
operations while ignoring the nature of other kinds of entities. This would prompt the question
of whether there are other kinds of necessity that respect only Socrates’ nature, for instance,
or only the natures of concrete objects, and so on. As a limiting case, there would presumably
also be a kind of necessity that respects absolutely no essences, which would lead to the
conclusion that there is an objective sense of necessity according to which nothing whatever
is necessary and everything is possible, contradicting the requirement that all tautologies be
objectively necessary.
65A similar principle is endorsed by Rayo (2013, ch. 5), although Rayo presupposes a notion of essence that
is not more fine-grained than metaphysical necessity.
66Bacon (2018) gives the same definition of being at least as broad as for necessity operators in general, i.e.
without restricting it to objective necessity operators.
67Note that this is not to say that every essentialist operator is an objective necessity operator. For instance,
if the nature of conjunction does not involve Socrates, then it is not true in virtue of the nature of conjunction
that Socrates is human or not human.
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One might object that it is not in fact arbitrary to privilege the (collective) nature of
the logical operations in this way: respecting only the nature of the logical operations marks
a natural, non-arbitrary stopping point for delineating the objective necessities, whereas
respecting absolutely no essences does not. And it would seem as though there are many
stricter necessities that respect the nature of the logical operations and some other entities.
For example, the mathematical necessities might be taken to be the necessities that respect
the (collective) nature of all mathematical entities. Indeed, Fine (1994) seems to suggest a
view along these lines right after proposing his view that the metaphysically necessary truths
are the propositions which are true in virtue of the nature of all objects:
Other familiar concepts of necessity (though not all of them) can be understood in
a similar manner. The conceptual necessities can be taken to be the propositions
which are true in virtue of the nature of all concepts; the logical necessities can
be taken to be the propositions which are true in virtue of the nature of all
logical concepts; and, more generally, the necessities of a given discipline, such as
mathematics or physics, can be taken to be those propositions which are true in
virtue of the characteristic concepts and objects of the discipline. (Fine, 1994, pp.
9-10)
However, the concepts of ‘conceptual’-, ‘logical’-, and ’mathematical’ necessity so defined are
not concepts of necessity in the usual sense even according to Fine’s own theory of essence.
Take the propositions true in virtue of the logical operations (or concepts, if you will). If
we assume that the nature of the logical operations does not involve Socrates, then it won’t
even be true in virtue of the nature of the logical operations that Socrates is identical to
himself, or that he is either human or not human.68 But this is clearly against the spirit
of the intended notion of ‘logical necessity’, and it disqualifies the notion from being an
objective necessity in the usual sense because it doesn’t even apply to all tautologies. Exactly
analogous considerations apply to ‘conceptual’- and ‘mathematical’ necessity characterized in
this way. Fine’s remarks above are therefore more plausibly interpreted as characterizations
of interesting subclasses of metaphysical necessities rather than different notions of necessity
that are broader than metaphysical necessity.
That being said, my aim here is not to deny that there may be something that could
be called a “modality” which is stricter than metaphysical necessity and which respects the
essences of the logical operations while failing to respect all essences. The point is that, from
an essentialist standpoint, there is good reason not to qualify any such “modality” as objective,
i.e. as pertaining to how things could genuinely have been. Singling out the logical operations
68Note that this is not peculiar to HLE, but also predicted by Fine’s LE. In fact, Fine (1995) suggests that
the operator λx.¬(x=x) in LE can be taken to express truth in virtue of the nature of the logical concepts, and
it is a theorem of LE that ¬λx.¬(x=x)(H(s) ∨ ¬H(s)).
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as special is objectionably arbitrary because the essences of the logical operations do not have
any special status compared to the essences of any other entities; the necessities that flow
wholly or partly from their nature are not more “strictly” necessary than necessities flowing
from the nature of non-logical entities such as redness. It is not more plausible to maintain,
e.g., that it is objectively possible for there to be red things that are not colored than to think
that it is objectively possible that not everything is self-identical. A view that privileges the
essences of the logical operations in this way would seem rather unprincipled. It is far more
natural and less arbitrary to require the category of objective necessity to respect all essences
rather than just those of the logical operations.
The case for (EON) thus appears to be very strong. At the very least, it seems to me that
the class of objective necessity operators that satisfy (EON) are of special interest, and the
broadest such operator would appear to be an extremely natural candidate for deserving the
name “metaphysical necessity”, which is a term of art, after all. One could still question our
argument for the necessary coextensiveness of Π and metaphysical necessity by questioning
whether metaphysical necessity is in fact the broadest objective necessity. If metaphysical
necessity is not the broadest objective necessity, then the entailment from a proposition being
metaphysically necessary to it being true in virtue of the nature of all propositions is blocked.
But this option seems unpromising. If metaphysical necessity is not the broadest objective
necessity, it is difficult to see what else it could be.69 Metaphysical necessity would then seem
to be akin to a kind of restricted quantification that is supposed to be of major importance for
philosophical theorizing but for which the nature of the restriction remains obscure—unlike the
qualification for other kinds of restricted necessity such as nomic necessity, the qualification
“metaphysical” is not of much help here.70
The Universal Propositional Reduction offers a compelling explanation of the necessary
coextensiveness between truth in virtue of the nature of all propositions and metaphysical
necessity: they are necessarily coextensive because they are identical. Conversely, their
necessary coextensiveness provides strong support for the reduction. For most theoretical
purposes, the difference between the thesis that metaphysical necessity just is truth in virtue
of the nature of all propositions and the thesis that they are merely necessarily coextensive
doesn’t matter. However, their identification does considerably simplify the joint theory
of metaphysical necessity and essence. Instead of adopting one of the extensions of HLE
containing the additional operator  mentioned at the beginning of Section 3, we can simply
69Note that the truth of (EON) in every objective sense of necessity already rules out there being no broadest
objective necessity (at least up to necessary coextensiveness). So it is no option to argue against identifying
metaphysical necessity with the broadest objectve necessity by holding that there is no broadest such necessity.
70One might alternatively try to tie metaphysical necessity to some alleged paradigm cases proposed by
Kripke (1980), such as the claim that Nixon is not an inanimate object, the necessity of origins, or certain
supervenience theses. But this leaves the notion far too unconstrained and it furthermore problematically
suggests that these alleged paradigm cases are in some sense uncontroversial. See Dorr (2016, p. 69) for
relevant discussion.
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work in HLE. Thus considerations of simplicity and elegance mark another point in favor of
the Universal Propositional Reduction over the thesis of mere necessary coextensiveness.
3.5 Does metaphysical necessity obey S5?
What is the correct logic of metaphysical necessity, given either of our two remaining candidate
reductions? We have seen that the propositional logic of both Ω and Π contains at least
all theorems of S4, but I have left open in my discussion of the Objectual and Propositional
reductions whether they also obey all of the principles of S5. I now turn to this matter.
Recall that in order to obtain all the principles of S5 for Ω or Π we need to supplement
the respective theories with the axioms DOM or DOM〈〉, respectively. Note that if we added
BΩ directly to HLER, then DOM would become derivable, and likewise for BΠ and DOM〈〉
in HLE. The logics HLER+DOM and HLER+BΩ thus have the same theorems, and likewise for
HLEDOM〈〉 and HLEBΠ . Furthermore, in HLER+DOM, DOM
〈〉 becomes derivable, so the theory
HLER+DOM properly includes the theory HLEDOM〈〉 , but not vice versa. Given the necessary
coextensiveness of metaphysical necessity and Π, rejecting DOM〈〉 is thus tantamount to
rejecting the B-schema for metaphysical necessity in this setting.
In the framework of Fine’s LE, the addition of DOM to the base theory E5 is incompatible
with certain true instances of the ‘independence principle’, which says that it is compatible
with the nature of any object x that there be nothing except the entities involved in the nature
of x (see Ditter (2020, p. 366 ff.)).71 For example, let Simple be some object whose nature
does not involve any other objects (Simple might be a mereological simple, for instance), and
suppose that Simple is not the only object there is. In Fine’s system E5DOM, it follows from
this that it is essential to Simple that Simple is not the only object there is, and thus that
there are objects that are not involved in Simple’s nature, contradicting the independence
principle. I have argued that the incompatibility of E5DOM with even a single such instance
of the independence principle constitutes a weighty reason for rejecting E5DOM. This raises
the question of whether a similar problem arises for HLEDOM〈〉 or HLER+DOM. Since the logic
HLE differs importantly from Fine’s LE—apart from the first-order vs. higher-order difference,
they are concerned with different notions of essence—it is not immediately obvious whether
HLEDOM〈〉 and HLER+DOM are subject to the same problem. I will now argue, however, that a
very similar issue arises for them.
The reason why the above-mentioned instance of the independence principle is incompatible
with E5DOM is that it is a theorem of E5DOM that whenever some objects are not all the
objects there are, then it lies in their nature not to be all the objects there are. So, for
example, it lies in the nature of Simple that Simple is not the only object there is. Although
this same principle does not hold in either HLEDOM〈〉 or HLER+DOM, a very close variant of
71In the language of HLE, we can express this as follows: ∀x(∀y(F [e](y)↔ ce([x]))→ ¬[x]¬∀yF (y)).
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it does hold in HLER+DOM. This variant says (roughly), that if some objects are not all the
objects there are, then it lies in their nature together with the nature of some logical operations
that they are not all the objects there are. Formally:72
(N-DOMe) ¬∀xR[e](x)→ R,[∀e],[¬],[→],[[e]]¬∀xR(x)
Given N-DOMe, we can infer that it lies in the nature of Simple, together with some logical
operations, that Simple is not the only object there is. This is prima facie implausible. Why
should the collective nature of Simple and some logical operations demand that there be objects
(entities of type e) that are distinct from Simple? The only plausible reason why this should
be so seems to be that the natures of the relevant logical operations involve some objects
distinct from Simple. However, despite the initial implausibility, the Platonist justification of
(R) discussed in Section 3.1 should in fact lead us to expect just that. Intuitively, the reason
is that the natures of negation, universality, etc. require there to be Forms corresponding
to these higher-order entities, and these Forms are plausibly distinct from Simple. Hence,
it lies in the nature of Simple together with these logical operations that Simple is not the
only object there is. So at least on the Platonist underpinnings of HLER+DOM, the above
consequence of N-DOMe has a principled explanation that defuses its initial implausibility.
Nevertheless, both HLER+DOM and HLEDOM〈〉 entail the following propositional version of
N-DOMe, according to which, if some propositions are not all the propositions there are, then
it lies in their nature together with the nature of some logical operations that they are not all
the propositions there are:
(N-DOM〈〉) ¬∀pR[〈〉](p)→ R,[∀〈〉],[¬],[→],[[〈〉]]¬∀pR(p)
We can construct a counterexample to N-DOM〈〉 as follows. Let C be the collection of all
propositions that are involved in the collective nature of the natural numbers and all the
logical operations. C thus contains all the haecceity propositions of the natural numbers
and the logical operations as well as all the propositions true in virtue of the nature of these
entities; but it plausibly doesn’t contain absolutely all propositions: for example, it arguably
doesn’t contain any propositions that concern particular humans. N-DOM〈〉 entails that it
lies in the nature of the propositions in C that they are not all the propositions there are.
But this prompts the question of why the nature of the propositions in C should demand that
there be propositions not among them. Unlike in the case of Simple above, there is no obvious
way of making this consequence more palatable; (R) is of no help here, and the propositions
involved in the nature of the logical operations are, by hypothesis, already contained in C. So
an explanation analogous to the Platonist explanation of the above consequence of N-DOMe
is not available here. Although this counterexample to N-DOM〈〉 is perhaps not altogether
72See Proposition 11 in Appendix A.2 for a proof. Note that N-DOMe is not derivable in HLEDOM〈〉 .
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decisive, it seems to me to carry enough weight to warrant considerable doubt about N-DOM〈〉,
and consequently about HLEDOM〈〉 (and HLER+DOM).
Does rejecting HLEDOM〈〉 motivate the rejection of S5 for metaphysical necessity? Not
necessarily. The derivation of N-DOM〈〉 in HLEDOM〈〉 crucially depends on an application of
RC0 to DOM〈〉;73 N-DOM〈〉 is not derivable without applying RC0 to DOM〈〉.74 So instead
of giving up DOM〈〉 and thus S5, one might restrict the application of RC to the theorems
of HLE, thereby barring its application to DOM〈〉 and, more generally, to those theorems of
HLEDOM〈〉 that are not already theorems of HLE.
75
Let HLEDOM〈〉− be the logic that results from HLEDOM〈〉 by replacing RC with the restricted
version of RC. In HLEDOM〈〉− , Π still satisfies all the principles of S5.
76 The main difference
to the situation in HLEDOM〈〉 is that the theorems of S5 that are not also theorems of S4
have a different logical status from the theorems of S4. Consider, for example, a universal
generalization of an instance of the BΠ-schema:
(*) ∀p(¬p→ Π¬Πp)
The only constants that occur in (*) are logical constants (recall that Π is short for λp.p ≡〈〉 p).
Hence, by RC0 we can infer in HLEDOM〈〉 :
(**) [∀],[¬],[〈〈〉〉],[≡],[→]∀p(¬p→ Π¬Πp)
In words, (**) says that (*) is true in virtue of the nature of the logical operations denoted by
the logical constants occurring in (*). Recall that this is a status enjoyed by every theorem of
HLE (and HLEDOM〈〉) whose only constants are logical. In HLEDOM〈〉− , by contrast, (**) is not
a theorem; indeed, it is subject to counterexample if the counterexample to N-DOM〈〉 above
is correct. In HLEDOM〈〉− , we merely have the Π-necessitation of (*):
(***) Π∀p(¬p→ Π¬Πp)
73The situation is thus analogous to the case of E5+DOM discussed in Ditter (2020, p. 369). There, too,
the incompatibility with the independence principle crucially depends on applying a necessitation-like rule to
DOM.
74Note that the derivation of N-DOM〈〉 also depends on the essentialist 5-schema from Section 2.4; see
Proposition 12 in Appendix A.2. However, giving up the essentialist 5-schema in order to preserve S5 for
Ω and Π is not an option, since the proofs of the 5Π - and 5Ω -schemas also depend on the essentialist
5-schema.
75Formally, this would amount to replacing the rule RC with:
(RC−) If `HLE φ1 ∧ ... ∧ φn → ψ, then ` F1,...,Fkφ1 ∧ ... ∧F1,...,Fkφn → F1,...,Fk,[A1],...,[Am]ψ, where
A1, . . . , Am are all the constants and free variables occurring in ψ but not any of φ1, . . . , φn.
In Ditter (2020), I have suggested (without endorsing) an analogous move to save S5 for metaphysical necessity
in the context of LE.
76One might think that one would also have to add the Π-necessitation of DOM〈〉 in order to derive all
theorems of S5 for Π. This is not necessary, however, because DOM〈〉 implies its own Π-necessitation
already in HLE, from which the Π-necessitation of BΠ can be derived in HLEDOM〈〉− .
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This feature of HLEDOM〈〉− may not constitute a decisive reason for rejecting HLEDOM〈〉− , but
it clearly makes the theory less unified and elegant compared to HLE. Taken together with the
failure of HLEDOM〈〉 , this underlines the costs of maintaining S5 for metaphysical necessity
in the setting of HLE. Our main motivation for introducing DOM〈〉 in the first place was to
explore the possibility of maintaining S5 for metaphysical necessity. In view of the problems
and complications involved in maintaining S5, it is worth questioning the motivations for S5.
Perhaps the strongest reason for thinking that S5 is the correct logic of metaphysical
necessity is the simplicity and elegance of S5 in comparison with other candidate modal
systems, such as S4. However, these simplicity considerations usually stem from viewing
the propositional logic of metaphysical necessity in isolation or in the context of a pure
quantificational logic without any further logical operators that might affect the logic of
necessity. But the question of whether S5 is simpler and more elegant than some other logic
of metaphysical necessity depends not only on considerations of simplicity and elegance in
such relatively isolated contexts; we ultimately need to consider the overall simplicity and
systematicity of theories that attempt to cover a wider class of phenomena—possibly using
further logical and non-logical vocabulary. A joint theory of essence and metaphysical necessity
is one such case. And if, as I’ve argued above, Π expresses metaphysical necessity (or is at
least necessarily coextensive with metaphysical necessity) then considerations of simplicity,
systematicity and elegance favor a logic of metaphysical necessity that is weaker than S5, but
not weaker than S4, because they favor the overall theory HLE over HLE+DOM〈〉−.77
Of course, considerations of simplicity and elegance are not the only aspects that we should
take into account in our theory choice. If there were strong independent reasons for accepting
DOM〈〉 for example, they might override such considerations. But it’s not clear that there are
such reasons. The argument for DOM in Fine (1995, p. 250) essentially takes for granted the
Barcan formula for metaphysical necessity, an assumption that is itself highly contentious.78
In fact, the most comprehensive defense of the Barcan formula in the literature in turn relies
at least in part on considerations of the simplicity and elegance of (higher-order) quantified
S5, in which the Barcan formula is derivable (Williamson (2013)). But these considerations
are based on the more isolated context of (higher-order) quantified modal logic and, as we
have seen, they do not carry over to the present, broader context of a joint theory of essence
and metaphysical necessity.
I conclude, therefore, that our examination of what a joint theory of essence and metaphys-
ical necessity might look like reveals that there are good reasons to think that the propositional
logic of metaphysical necessity is weaker than S5, though not weaker than S4.
77It is worth noting that due to the essentialist 5-schema, we still have the necessity of distinctness in HLE,
since ¬(x ≡ y)→ Π¬(x ≡ y) is derivable in HLE from the essentialist 5-schema.
78See Ditter (2020, pp. 359 ff.) for a discussion of Fine’s argument.
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4 Conclusion
In this paper I have proposed a joint theory of essence and metaphysical necessity according
to which metaphysical necessity is just a special case of essence: metaphysical necessity
just is truth in virtue of the nature of all propositions. I have argued that this reduction
thesis presents itself as the simplest and most natural hypothesis about the relation between
metaphysical necessity and essence once we spell out a general and systematic joint theory
of these notions. The argument I have presented for the reduction thesis rests on abductive
considerations and on the characterization of metaphysical necessity as the broadest objective
necessity. Taken together, these considerations have also been shown to motivate the view
that the logic of metaphysical necessity is weaker than S5.
This revisionary conclusion about the logic of metaphysical necessity serves to illustrate
that the project of reducing metaphysical necessity to essence is by no means bound to
preserve all of our prior views about metaphysical necessity—the account may well lead
to revisionary consequences. Indeed, one of the most promising philosophical upshots of
investigating reductive accounts of metaphysical necessity (and other notions) is their potential
to lead us to rethink our prior views about the reduced notion. Of course, the essentialist
reductions of metaphysical necessity considered in this paper leave open many questions about
which propositions are metaphysically necessary given these reductions. While many paradigm
cases of metaphysically necessary truths, such as uncontroversially necessary logical truths
like ‘Everything is self-identical’ or truths like ‘All red things are colored’, plausibly come out
as metaphysically necessary given the essentialist reduction, it is an open question whether
other putatively metaphysically necessary truths like, e.g., the necessity of origins or various
supervenience theses do so as well. But if truth in virtue of the nature of all propositions really
is the broadest objective necessity, then the failure to provide a plausible essentialist source
for some putative necessity need not count as evidence against the essentialist account; rather,
it might well give us reason to doubt the metaphysical necessity of the proposition in question.
In my view, the fact that such questions arise is a virtue of the account, since it invites us to
investigate the status of such propositions through a novel conceptual lens. Equipped with
a systematic theory of essence, such an investigation strikes me as an important research
program that affords us a new perspective on a number of issues concerning metaphysical
modality.
A Appendix
A.1 The theory HLE
The theory HLE is constituted by the following axioms and rules.
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(i) Background logic:
(PC) φ, whenever φ is a tautology
(UI) ∀τ (F )→ F (a)
(EG) F (a)→ ∃τ (F )
(MP) If ` φ and ` φ→ ψ, then ` ψ
(GEN) If ` φ→ ψ and v is free in ψ but not φ, then ` φ→ ∀τv(ψ)
(INST) If ` φ→ ψ and v is free in φ but not ψ, then ` ∃τv(φ)→ ψ
(Ref) F ≡σ F
(LL) F ≡σ G→ (φ[G/v]→ φ[F/v])
(β-conversion) φ↔ φ∗, where φ∗ is derived from φ by replacing some constituent of
the form (λv1 . . . vn.ψ)(t1, ..., tn) with ψ[ti/vi]
(η-conversion) φ↔ φ∗, where φ∗ is derived from φ by replacing some constituent of
the form (λv1 . . . vk.F (v1, . . . , vk)), where none of v1, . . . , vk is free in F , with F
(ii) Background essentialist axioms
(Permutation) F1,...,Fnφ → Fπ(1),...,Fπ(n)φ, where π is a permutation function on
{1, ..., n}
(Idempotence) F1,...,Fnφ→ F1,...,Fn−1φ, if Fn = Fi, for some i = 1, ..., n− 1
(Separation) F1,...,Fn,λx.(G(x)∨H(x))φ→ F1,...,Fn,G,Hφ
(Subtraction) ∀xσ¬Fn+1(x)→ (F1,...,Fn+1φ↔ F1,...,Fnφ)
(Decomposition) F1,...,Fk,[B]φ→ F1,...,Fk,[A1],...,[An]φ, where A1, ..., An are all the con-
stants and free variables of B
(MON1) ∀xσ(F1(x)→ G(x))→ (F1,...Fkφ→ G,F2,...,Fkφ), 1 ≤ k
(MON2) F1,...Fkφ→ F1,...,Fnφ, k ≤ n
(iii) Axioms for rigidity
(R-Comp) ∀X〈σ〉∃Y [σ]∀xσ(X(x)↔ Y (x))
(R-Ext) ∀X [σ]∀Y [σ](∀xσ(X(x)↔ Y (x))→ X ≡[σ] Y )
(Rigidity) R[σ](x)→ RR(x)
(R-Equiv) R,F1,...,Fnφ↔ [R],F1,...,Fnφ, where R is a rigid predicate
(iv) Core essentialist axioms and rules
(CH) G1,...,Gn,cσ(F1,...,Fk)φ→ G1,...,Gn,F1,...,Fkφ
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(RC) If ` φ1∧. . .∧φn → ψ, then ` F1,...,Fkφ1∧. . .∧F1,...,Fkφn → F1,...,Fk,[A1],...,[Am]ψ,
where A1, . . . , Am are all the constants and free variables occurring in ψ but not
any of φ1, . . . , φn
(T) F1,...,Fnφ→ φ
(4) F1,...,Fnφ→ F1,...,Fn,[σ1,...,σn ]F1,...,Fnφ, whenever F
σ1
1 , ..., F
σn
n are rigid predi-
cates
(5) ¬F1,...,Fnφ → F1,...,Fn,[¬],[σ1,...,σn ],[φ]¬F1,...,Fnφ, whenever F
σ1





In this section, we prove some of the theorems appealed to in the main text.
Proposition 1 (Inheritance). ` (F1, . . . , Fn) σ s ∧G1,...,Gk,[s]φ→ G1,...,Gk,F1,...,Fnφ
Proof. By β-conversion, we have ` (F1, . . . , Fn) σ s → cσ(F1, . . . , Fn)(s). By MON1,
` ∀zσ(λx.(x ≡ s)(z)→ cσ(F1, . . . , Fn)(z))→ (G1,...,Gk,[s]φ→ G1,...,Gk,cσ(F1,...,Fn)φ). By CH
and classical logic we obtain ` (F1, . . . , Fn) σ s ∧G1,...,Gk,[s]φ→ G1,...,Gk,F1,...,Fnφ.
Proposition 2. (i) ` s ≥σ,σ s. (ii) ` t ≥τ,σ s ∧ s ≥σ,ρ r → t ≥τ,ρ r.
Proof. (i) By MON1, (1) ` ∀y(X [σ](y) ↔ (λz.z ≡σ s)(y)) → ((Xφ ↔ [s]φ). By clas-
sical reasoning, (2) ` ∀y(X [σ](y) ↔ (λz.z ≡σ s)(y)) → X(s). From this we obtain (3)
` ∀y(X [σ](y) ↔ (λz.z ≡σ s)(y)) → XX(s) by the instance X [σ](s) → XX(s) of Rigidity.
Combining (1) and (3) we obtain (4) ` ∀y(X [σ](y) ↔ (λz.z ≡σ s)(y)) → ∃X [σ][s]X(s).
Hence, by classical reasoning, (5) ` ∃X [σ]∀y(X [σ](y) ↔ (λz.z ≡σ s)(y)) → ∃X [σ][s]X(s).
But the antecedent of (5) is an instance of R-Comp, so (6) ` ∃X [σ][s]X(s). But (7)
` [s]X(s) ↔ [s](λx.X(x))(s) by β-conversion. From this, s ≥σ,σ s follows by (6) and
classical reasoning.
(ii) By Proposition 1 and classical reasoning, ` [s]z(r) ∧ t ≥τ,σ s → ∃z[t]z(r). From
this, the claim follows by classical reasoning and the definition of ≥.
Proposition 3 (Haec). ` F1,...,Fnφ↔ h(F1,...,Fn)φ.
Proof. Left-to-right direction: it follows at once from Proposition 2(i), the definition of
h(F1, . . . , Fn) and MON1 that for every Fi, ` ∀x(Fi(x) → (h(F1, . . . , Fn)) σi x). Thus by
MON1 and Permutation we obtain ` F1,...,Fnφ → cσi (h(F1,...,Fn)),...,cσn (h(F1,...,Fn))φ. From
this, ` F1,...,Fnφ → h(F1,...,Fn)φ follows by CH and Idempotence. For the right-to-left
direction, we have (1) ` ∀y(X [σ](y) ↔ (λz.z ≡σ x)(y)) ∧ (X(x) ≡〈〉 p) → [x]p by Rigidity,
MON1, and LL. From (1), we get (2) ` ∀p(h(F1, . . . , Fn)(p) → c〈〉(F1, . . . , Fn)(p)). Hence,
from (2), MON1 and CH we obtain ` h(F1,...,Fn) → F1,...,Fnφ.
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Proposition 4 (K). ` F1,...,Fn(φ→ ψ)→ (F1,...,Fnφ→ F1,...,Fnψ).
Proof. Immediate from RC.
In what follows, we will use the following abbreviations: F ≈ G := ∀x(F (x) ↔ G(x));
F ⊆ G := ∀x(F (x)→ G(x)); Ω := λxe.x ≡ x; Π := λp〈〉.p ≡ p. We now show that the logic
of Ω is at least S4 in HLER.
Proposition 5 (ENΩ). `HLER F1,...,Fnφ→ Ωφ.
Proof. By (R) and classical reasoning, we have `HLER ∀xσi(Fi(x)→ ∃X〈e〉Xx ≡ x). From
this we get `HLER ∀xσi(Fi(x)→ Ωx ≡ x) by MON1 and classical reasoning. Hence, `HLER
∀xσi(Fi(x) → cσi(Ω)(x)). Therefore, `HLER F1,...,Fnφ → cσ1 (Ω),...,cσn (Ω)φ by Permutation
and n applications of MON1, whence by CH and Idempotence, `HLER F1,...,Fnφ→ Ωφ.
Corollary 1 (RNΩ). If `HLER φ then `HLER Ωφ
Proposition 6 (4Ω). `HLER Ωφ→ ΩΩφ.
Proof. Let X [e] be a variable of rigid type that does not occur in φ. By MON1, the essentialist
(4)-schema and classical reasoning, we have (1) `HLER X ≈ Ω→ (Ωφ→ X,[[e]]Xφ). From
this we get (2) `HLER Ωφ ∧ X ≈ Ω → X,[[e],〈〉]Xφ. By EN
Ω , (3) `HLER Ωφ ∧ X ≈
Ω→ ΩXφ. By classical reasoning and RNΩ we have (4) `HLER ΩX ⊆ Ω and by MON1
and RNΩ , (5) `HLER Ω(X ⊆ Ω → (Xφ → Ωφ)). From (4), (5) and (K) we get (6)
`HLER ΩXφ → ΩΩφ. So by (3), (6) and classical reasoning, (7) `HLER X ≈ Ω →
(Ωφ → ΩΩφ). But X is not free in φ, so (8) `HLER ∃X(X ≈ Ω) → (Ωφ → ΩΩφ).
But ∃X(X ≈ Ω) is an instance of R-Comp, so (9) `HLER Ωφ→ ΩΩφ.
Corollary 2. In HLER, the logic of Ω is at least S4.
In HLER+DOM, we can further prove:
Proposition 7 (BΩ). `HLER+DOM ¬φ→ Ω¬Ωφ.
Proof. Let X [e] be a variable of rigid type that does not occur in φ. By DOM we have (1)
`HLER+DOM ∀xX(x) → X∀xX(x). By the essentialist (5)-schema, (2) `HLER+DOM ¬Xφ →
X,[¬],[[e]],[φ]¬Xφ. From (2), we obtain by MON1 and EN
Ω , (3) `HLER+DOM ¬Ωφ ∧
∀xX(x) → Ω¬Xφ. By MON1 and RNΩ , we obtain (4) `HLER+DOM Ω(∀xX(x) →
(¬Ωφ↔ ¬Xφ)). From (4), (1) and (K), we can infer (5) `HLER+DOM ∀xX(x)→ (Ω¬Ωφ↔
Ω¬Xφ). From (3) and (5), we obtain (6) `HLER+DOM ¬Ωφ ∧ ∀xX(x) → Ω¬Ωφ. So
by classical reasoning, (7) `HLER+DOM ∃X∀xX(x) → (¬Ωφ → Ω¬Ωφ), because X is
not free in φ. But the antecedent of (7) is equivalent to an instance of R-Comp, which
gives us (8) `HLER+DOM ¬Ωφ → Ω¬Ωφ. By the contrapositive of TΩ , (8) implies
`HLER+DOM ¬φ→ Ω¬Ωφ.
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Corollary 3. In HLER+DOM, the logic of Ω is at least S5.
By using semantic techniques, it is possible to show that the logic of Ω is exactly S4
(S5) in HLER (HLER+DOM); see Ditter (MS). The analogs for Π of the preceeding results are
proved exactly like those for Ω, except that we use ENΠ and RNΠ instead of ENΩ and
RNΩ in the relevant places. By avoiding appeal to ENΩ and RNΩ , both of which depend
on (R), the proofs for Π avoid making use of (R) and therefore go through in HLE.
Proposition 8 (ENΠ). ` F1,...,Fnφ→ Πφ
Corollary 4 (RNΠ). If ` φ then ` Πφ.
Proposition 9 (4Π). ` Πφ→ ΠΠφ.
Corollary 5. In HLE, the logic of Π is at least S4.
The BΠ-principle becomes provable once we add DOM〈〉 to HLE.
Proposition 10 (BΠ). `HLEDOM〈〉 ¬φ→ Π¬Πφ.
Corollary 6. In HLEDOM〈〉, the logic of Π is at least S5.
As in the case of Ω, we can show by using semantic techniques that the logic of Ω is
exactly S4 (S5) in HLE (HLEDOM〈〉); see Ditter (MS).
Proposition 11 (N-DOMe). `HLER+DOM ¬∀xR(x)→ R,[∀e],[¬],[→],[[e]]¬∀xR(x), where R is
of type [e]
Proof. Let R be a rigid predicate of type [e].
1. ∀xR(x)→ R∀xR(x) DOM
2. R,[∀],[→],[[e]](∀xR(x)→ R∀xR(x)) 1, RC
0, R-Equiv
3. R,[∀],[→],[[e]],[¬](¬R∀xR(x)→ ¬∀xR(x)) 2, RC
4. R,[∀],[→],[[e]],[¬]¬R∀xR(x)→ R,[∀],[→],[[e]],[¬]¬∀xR(x) 3, K
5. ¬∀xR(x)→ ¬R∀xR(x) T
6. ¬R∀xR(x)→ R,[[e]],[¬],[∀],[R]¬R∀xR(x) (5), Decomposition
7. ¬R∀xR(x)→ R,[[e]],[¬],[∀]¬R∀xR(x) 6, R-Equiv, Idempotence
8. ¬R∀xR(x)→ R,[∀],[→],[[e]],[¬]¬R∀xR(x) 7, MON2, Permutation
9. ¬∀xR(x)→ R,[∀],[→],[[e]],[¬]¬∀xR(x) 4, 5, 8
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Proposition 12 (N-DOM〈〉). `HLEDOM〈〉 ¬∀pR(p)→ R,[∀〈〉],[¬],[→],[[〈〉]]¬∀pR(p), where R is
of type [〈〉]
Proof. Exactly analogous to the proof of Proposition 11.
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Hale, B. (2013). Necessary Beings: An Essay on Ontology, Modality, and the Relations
Between Them. Oxford University Press.
Hanson, W. H. (1997). The concept of logical consequence. Philosophical Review, 106(3):365–
409.
Klement, K. C. (2010a). Russell, his paradoxes, and Cantor’s theorem: Part i. Philosophy
Compass, 5(1):16–28.
40
Klement, K. C. (2010b). Russell, his paradoxes, and Cantor’s theorem: Part ii. Philosophy
Compass, 5(1):29–41.
Kripke, S. A. (1963). Semantical considerations on modal logic. Acta Philosophica Fennica,
16(1963):83–94.
Kripke, S. A. (1980). Naming and Necessity. Harvard University Press.
Leslie, S. (2011). Essence, plenitude, and paradox. Philosophical Perspectives, 25(1):277–296.
Linnebo, O. (2017). Plural Quantification. In Zalta, E. N., editor, The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy. Metaphysics Research Lab, Stanford University, summer 2017 edition.
Malink, M. (2013). Aristotle’s Modal Syllogistic. Harvard University Press.
Myhill, J. (1958). Problems arising in the formalization of intensional logic. Logique Et
Analyse, 1(1):78–83.
Newlands, S. (2013). Leibniz and the ground of possibility. Philosophical Review, 122(2):155–
187.
Nolan, D. (2011). The extent of metaphysical necessity. Philosophical Perspectives, 25(1):313–
339.
Orey, S. (1959). Model theory for the higher order predicate calculus. Transactions of the
American Mathematical Society, 92(1):72–84.
Prior, A. N. (1971). Objects of Thought. Clarendon Press.
Rayo, A. (2013). The Construction of Logical Space. Oxford University Press.
Rayo, A. and Yablo, S. (2001). Nominalism through de-nominalization. Noûs, 35(1):74–92.
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